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ABSTRACT 
Organisational routines i.e. firms specific, path dependent, repeated patterns of 
collective behaviour are at the heart of the capabilities-based perspective of building 
competitive advantage. It is therefore not surprising to see a large body of scholarly work on 
the impact of organisational routines on performance of firms. However, in contrast to the 
number of studies on the impact of organisational routines, there are far fewer studies on the 
mechanisms by which organisations filter through alternates before adopting routines. The 
three essays in this dissertation contribute to our understanding of what influences 
organisational choices in adopting routines i.e. how to choose what to do?  
Building on the concepts in evolutionary economics, behavioural theory of the firm, 
and attention-based theory of strategic decision making, we argue that performance is not just 
a function of availability of resources and capabilities, but it is also guided by structural 
constraints that act as attention-focusing mechanism and influence choices in allocating 
limited resources. We propose that these mechanisms operate across macro- and micro-levels 
and that the observed behaviour of the macro-system is the aggregated result of the 
heterogeneous choices made by agents at the micro-level under these attention-focusing 
mechanisms.     
The three essays in the dissertation contribute to our understanding of how three 
different attention focusing mechanism namely organisational mandates, competitive 
pressure under constraints, and multipoint competition focus the attention of decision makers 
on some opportunities more than others. These attention-focusing mechanisms help decision 
makers to filter though alternatives and make micro-level choices to adopt or not to adopt 
routines that influence innovation performance at a macro-level.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Roughly speaking, rationality is concerned with the selection of preferred behavior 
alternatives in terms of some system of values, whereby the consequences of 
behavior can be evaluated. 
- Herbert Simon on rational decision-making in organisations, 
Administrative Behavior, 1947, p84 
This dissertation started as a discussion on ‘innovation under constraints’ at the 
Ingenuity Conference 2011, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada. Our aim was to build 
on the concept of organisational ingenuity i.e. “the ability to create innovative solutions 
within structural constraints using limited resources and imaginative problem solving” 
(Lampel, Honig, & Drori, 2014: 465) and understand  how constraints influence innovation 
in firms. Over the next few months a review of the literature on the topic revealed two 
important threads that led to this project. In the introduction we will develop these two 
threads i.e. (i) the need to study innovation through the lens of adoption of routines under 
constraints and (ii) the need to study the causal relations between the macro- and micro-levels 
in strategic decision making.  
First, a review of the literature on innovation under constraints with focus on the 
theoretical lenses dealing with theory of constraints, organisational slack, and bricolage1, 
show that while multiple theoretical lenses have attempted to explain the influence of 
resource constraints (e.g. financial resources) on the incidence of innovation, none adequately 
explain the influence of other structural constraints (e.g. constraints generated by a firm’s 
                                                             
1
 The literature review is an excerpt from Banerjee, A. 2014. The roots of organisational 
ingenuity: How do qualitatively superior ideas come about? In B. Honig, J. Lampel, & I. 
Drori (Eds.), Handbook of organisational and entrepreneurial ingenuity: 15 - 33: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Inc. 
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corporate policies). Evidence suggests that innovation performance is not just influenced by 
the availability of resources, but it is also guided by structural constraints that influence the 
development of path dependent capabilities. These capabilities are built through micro-level 
choices made by decision makers in the adoption or creation of new organisational routines 
i.e. firms specific, path dependent, repeated patterns of collective behaviour (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003). This calls for a closer look at the influence of structural 
constraints as attention-focusing mechanisms by which organisations filter through alternates 
before adopting organisational routines (Ocasio, 1997).  
Second, our analysis shows that to investigate how various constraints influence 
innovation at the macro-level we need to understand at a micro-level how constraints 
influence decision makers’ interpretation of problems and focus their attention on benefits of 
adopting a routine. In essence, there is the need to connect the macro- and micro-perspectives 
of strategy and strategic decision. To that extent our intent is to build on the attention-based 
perspective of strategy formulation and contribute to the discussion on micro-foundations of 
strategic management research (Ocasio & Joseph, 2005)2.  
In the rest of the introduction we introduce the concept of organisational routines 
from a capabilities perspective, set the boundary conditions of studying organisational 
routines, and introduce the structural constraints as attention-focussing mechanisms that we 
study in the subsequent essays.   
  
                                                             
2
 . In recent years the micro-foundations agenda has become increasingly influential in 
strategic management research. For instance, the Strategic Management Society did a special 
conference on ‘Micro-Foundations for Strategic Management Research: Embracing 
Individuals, 2014’ in an attempt to give more structure to the questions of theory 
development, empirical measurement, data collection, and statistical implementation of 
micro-level strategic management research. 
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1.1 REVIEW OF INNOVATION UNDER CONSTRAINTS  
The ability to continuously innovate is the cornerstone of growth, regeneration, and 
competitive advantage (Burgelman, 1983; Dosi, Teece, & Chytry, 1998; Schumpeter, 1911). 
Hence it is not surprising that both practitioners and researchers have tackled this topic from 
many perspectives.  Empirical evidence in innovation studies point out that there is a clear 
variance in innovation outcome across firms. Variables that explain this heterogeneity include 
firm size (Damanpour, 1992), new entrants (Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986), and 
access to greater resources and capabilities (Methe, Swaminathan, Mitchell, & Toyama, 
1997). Within the resource-based perspective some of the highly cited determinants of 
innovation include R&D intensity (Parthasarthy & Hammond, 2002),  funding  (Almus & 
Czarnitzki, 2003; Kortum & Lerner, 2000), annual turnover of resources (Mohr, 1969), 
number of employees (Rogers, 1983), and slack resources  (Damanpour, 1991; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996; O'Brien, 2003). 
Considering the impact of internal organisational determinants of innovation, 
researchers have studied the impact of culture (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 
1996; Tellis, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2009), leadership (Elenkov, Judge, & Wright, 2005), 
strategic orientation of upper echelons (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), 
environment for experimentation (Anderson & West, 1998; Damanpour, 1991), tolerance to 
failed ideas (Madjar, Oldham, & Pratt, 2002), and risk appetite (Anderson & West, 1998; 
King, 1992).  
Furthermore, within the process perspective the effect of learning (Ahuja & Lampert, 
2001), development of employees and fostering diversity (Crossan & Hulland, 2002), 
knowledge (Zhang & Li, 2010), and external linkages (Atuahene-Gima, 1995) have also been 
studied.    
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From an organisational structures perspective determinants include specialization and 
centralization structures (Damanpour, 1991; Zaltman, Duncan, & Holbek, 1973), 
stratification (Kanter, 1983), matrix structures (Staw, 1990), organisational complexity and 
administrative intensity (Damanpour, 1991), and formalization (Anderson & West, 1998; 
Damanpour, 1991).    
In contrast to the richness of these theoretical perspectives, the effect of constraints on 
innovation is under researched. In our search for answers, we review three frameworks that 
address innovation under constraints. We start with the theory of constraints that proposes 
ways to optimize a solution under constraints. We then review the literature on organisational 
slack that studies the relationship between the availability of resources and the generation of 
new ideas on performance, and conclude with a review of bricolage that studies value 
creation under resource constraints.  
Our review of the empirical evidence from the existing literature on the relationship 
between constraints and innovation indicates that the focus within this stream has 
overwhelmingly been on resources constraints (e.g. financial or human resources) as opposed 
to structural constraints (e.g. rules or processes). We find that there is a need to study 
innovation through the lens of adoption of organisational routines that build capabilities as a 
response to structural constraints. This analysis point us towards a capabilities-based 
argument for search and innovation (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003). 
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1.1.1 THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS 
Pioneered by E.M. Goldratt (Goldratt, 1987) in the 1980s, the theory of constraints looks at 
how constraints limit the ability of achieving higher levels of performance relative to the goal 
(Aryanezhad, Badri, & Komijan, 2010). Rooted in the operations management literature, it 
builds on the principles of continuous improvement, but it’s point of departure from such 
theories is that it takes a systems perspective (Dettmer, 1997). For instance a standard 
continuous improvement methodology would prescribe that all components of a process must 
be optimized to their full potential to achieve the best performance, whereas the theory of 
constraints would highlight the interdependence of the processes and their links with 
constraints to prescribe ways to exploit constraints i.e. get the most out of the system as a 
whole under constraints. Goldratt’s central premise is that organisations exist as systems of 
interacting and not independent processes.  
The theory of constraints is not so much a management theory devised to explain 
innovation under constraint but a theory aimed at optimization of a solution in an iterative 
process. As Dettmer (1997) notes, it is a collection of “system principles and tools, or 
methods for solving the problem of improving overall system performance”. Since its 
introduction, the theory has been steadily enriched by a wide range of tools and techniques 
applicable in diverse settings; from accounting to operations research. The theory is fairly 
broad in its consideration of constraints like resources such as equipment and people and to 
structural constraints like policy.  
Its main limitation with regards to studying innovation is that it does not provide a 
theoretical basis to understand how inventions come up in the first place. Moving away from 
an ‘optimization’ perspective to understand if constraints can ‘trigger’ the invention process 
we turn our attention to other two concepts namely, organisational slack and bricolage.  
14 
 
1.1.2 ORGANISATIONAL SLACK 
Researchers have often used organisational slack to understand the effect of availability of 
resources on innovation. Nohria and Gulati (1996) define slack as resources that are in excess 
of the necessary minimum amount required to run the operations of a firm. While it is 
recognized that by nature slack resources can be diverted or redeployed for the achievement 
of organisational goals (George, 2005), scholars have also noted that some type of slack 
resources are more easily redeployed than others. Therefore, the slack construct is often 
studied as a contrast between slack that is easy to recover (i.e. high-discretion or unabsorbed 
slack) or slack that is not easy to recover (i.e. low-discretion or absorbed slack) (See (Nohria 
& Gulati, 1996; Sharfman, Wolf, Chase, & Tansik, 1988; Singh, 1986a) for further details on 
the type of slack). In our discussion, we are interested to understand what may be the effect 
of availability of slack (i.e. no resource constraints) and non-availability of slack (i.e. 
resource constraints) on innovation outcomes.  
It has been theorized that the presence of recoverable slack in an organisation acts as a 
buffer that can be redistributed within the organisation depending on structural constraints. 
Scholars have argued that the presence of such a resource buffer can have positive as well as 
negative effects on performance outcomes. For instance, organisational theorists who draw 
parallels between the firm and an organism, view the ultimate goal of organisations as 
survival and growth (Cyert & March, 1963; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). In that context, while 
the organisation theorists recognize the cost of slack to the firm in the short term, they 
propose that it is necessary for the survival of the firm in the long term. They argue that the 
presence of slack resources buffers the core of the firm in times of distress (Cyert & March, 
1963; Levinthal & March, 1981) and from environmental shocks (Meyer, 1982) thereby 
impacting long term performance.  
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In contrast to this view, agency theorists consider the firm as a nexus of contracts 
between principals and agents (Fama, 1980). Therefore agency theory explicitly rejects the 
notion of the firm as an organisation and in the words of Davis and Stout (1992) turns the 
organisation theory perspective 'upside down'. The agency argument is that managers acting 
as agents inherently have a set of goals that are not always aligned with the principals (For 
example pursuit of power, prestige, money, and job security). Managers may use slack to 
engage in excessive diversification, empire-building, and on the job shirking (Tan & Peng, 
2003). These agency theorists go on to claim that slack is in fact the source of the agency 
problems, i.e. firms are inefficient in allocation of resources termed as 'X-inefficiency' 
(Leibenstein, 1980). From this perspective the presence of excess slack resources has also 
been found to diminish competitiveness in organisations (Davis & Stout, 1992). 
Building on this tension between organisational theory and agency theory, researchers 
have therefore proposed a curvilinear i.e. an inverted U relationship between organisational 
slack and innovation outcome (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). To summarize the implications of 
slack, we find that while resources are necessary for innovation too few or too many 
resources constraints are not conducive to produce new solutions. Based on this discussion, 
we can infer that depending on the level of slack in the organisation, an increase in 
constraints may indeed improve performance3.   
The main limitation of the theory is that, while it can potentially explain the relation 
between resource constraints and incidence of innovation, it does not shed light on the 
influence of the structural constraints that influences how resources are distributed for 
innovation. For example how does corporate innovation strategy that introduces structural 
constraints on how resources are distributed influence innovation? 
                                                             
3
 See table 8.1 for a summary of the highly cited literature on slack and the corresponding 
variables used. 
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1.1.3 BRICOLAGE 
Another body of literature cited in this context of innovation under constraints is that of 
bricolage. Originally proposed by Levi-Strauss in his seminal book in 1962, ‘La pensée 
sauvage’ (English version published in 1966 as ‘The Savage Mind’) in the field of 
anthropology, it later gained popularity in management literature in various contexts like 
innovation research and organisation theory (Duymedjian & Rüling, 2010)4.  
Our interest is to understand how the concept of bricolage is used in the context of 
innovation. We find that there are two ways to looks at this literature i.e. from the perspective 
of the central actor called the bricoleur (For example the entrepreneur or the artist) or from 
the process perspective (For example resource mobilization). In Levi-Strauss’s original 
conceptualization the artisan or bricoleur plays a central role in bringing together seemingly 
redundant artefacts in order to compose something meaningful. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that many scholars such as Miner, Bassoff, and Moorman (2001) and Garud and Karnøe 
(2003) have highlighted the characteristics of the involved actors, most notably their 
resourcefulness and ability to improvise.  
Bricolage is understood as a process of resource mobilization when the usual 
resources to meet an objective are not available (Desa, 2012). Such resource mobilization can 
lead to novel solutions and entrepreneurial ventures as noted by Baker and Nelson (2005) 
definition, “making do by applying combinations of resources already at hand to new 
problems and opportunities”. This view is close to ‘improvisation’ and therefore the two 
constructs have often been studied in close association (Moorman & Miner, 1998; Weick, 
                                                             
4
 This emergence in management theory is fairly recent as Boxenbaum, E., & Rouleau, L. 
2011. New knowledge products as bricolage: Metaphors and scripts in organisational theory. 
Academy of Management Review, 36(2): 272-296. note, of all the papers published in the 
database ABI/ INFORM between 1992 and 2009 with the keyword Bricolage, 87 % were 
published after the year 2000. 
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1998). However, as Baker notes “While bricolage may imply improvisation, bricolage also 
occurs in the absence of improvisation, and that it is therefore important to recognize that 
they are separate constructs” (Baker, 2007). For example, improvisation has been consistently 
observed in many creative disciplines where constraints are not observed like musical 
improvisation (Chase & Portney-Chase, 1988; Kernfeld, 1997), theatre (Knapp, 1985; Spolin, 
1999) and sports (Bjurwill, 1993). In summary, the central difference between bricolage and 
improvisation as a process is that improvisation can happen without constraints whereas the 
central theme of bricolage is ‘scavenging’ for resources by the bricoleur5. 
We find that while bricolage is a powerful theory, it however looks at value creation 
in general i.e. creating something from nothing (Baker & Nelson, 2005) as opposed to a 
specific case of problem solving or innovation. Therefore, while the theory of bricolage at 
best provides a basis to understand value creation in resource constrained environments 
(often termed as frugal innovation or Jugaad (Radjou, Prabhu, & Ahuja, 2012), it does not 
address goal-oriented problem solving and the search for superior innovation outcomes.  
 
1.2 STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS AS ATTENTION FOCUSING MECHANISMS   
From the brief review of the three frameworks that are commonly cited in the context of 
innovation under constraints (i.e. theory of constraints, organisational slack and bricolage), 
we found only a partial explanation for the emergence of innovation under structural 
constraints. Essentially these frameworks cannot help us understand how constraints and 
particularly structural constraints influence the innovation search process.  
Behavioural theorists propose that the search for innovation is triggered by a 
mismatch of aspiration and performance (Cyert & March, 1963), which leads us to ask - Do 
                                                             
5
 Table 8.2 lists the central theme of some of the cited studies on bricolage in the context of 
entrepreneurial bricolage and social bricolage. 
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structural constraints influence aspiration? Can the behavioural theory of the firm help us 
understand the influence of structural constraints on focusing the aspiration of decision 
makers? This points toward a need to understand the link between structural constraints and 
aspiration. Aspiration, defined as the smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by 
the decision maker (Schneider, 1992),  is a central construct that is argued to trigger 
innovation search when it is more than expected performance (Cyert & March, 1963). Put 
differently our intent is therefore to use the foundations of the behavioural theory of the firm 
to understand how structural constraints might focus the attention of decision makers on 
certain aspiration that influence the search for innovation 6.  
We know from the central postulates that make up the cognitive foundations of the 
behavioural theory, that individuals do not maximize, they satisfice. This implies that as the 
knowledge of possible solutions is limited and as there is a cost of acquiring new knowledge; 
decision makers, within the limits of their knowledge are likely to seek a solution that meets 
their aspiration – and not necessarily seek the universally best solution for a problem. 
However, if performance falls below aspiration, it triggers changes in these rules such as 
triggering organisational search behaviour. This leads to problemistic search – Implying that 
search for new solutions is motivated by the objective to achieve goals that are set within the 
system of values that focus the attention of decision makers on specific aspiration7. There is 
                                                             
6
 For a detailed review of research on the behavioural theory of the firm see Argote, L., & 
Greve, H. R. 2007. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm--40 Years and Counting: Introduction 
and Impact. Organisation Science, 18(3): 337-349, Gavetti, G., Greve, H. R., Levinthal, D. 
A., & Ocasio, W. 2012. The Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Assessment and Prospects. 
Academy of Management Annals, 6(1): 1-40. 
 
7
 At the same time a behavioural theory based explanation of innovation from problemistic 
search does not preclude the role of slack based search or from acquiring solutions available 
in the environment. Therefore a firm may build a solution stock using slack resources or by 
acquiring knowledge from the environment Greve, H. R. 2003. A behavioral theory of R&D 
expenditures and innovations: Evidence from shipbuilding. Academy of Management 
Journal, 46(6): 685-702.. 
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strong empirical evidence to show that firms indeed trigger problemistic search when 
performance falls below aspiration, for example, we know that firms tend to invest more in 
R&D (Antonelli, 1989; Hundley, Jacobson, & Park, 1996), as well as seek new R&D 
processes (Bolton, 1993) when their performance is below aspiration levels.  
The behavioural theory of the firm suggests that aspiration are set as a result of certain 
value based objectives defined by the organisation (Simon, 1947). Structural constraints 
define the value system within which performance can be assessed. For instance past 
(historical) and social (peer) performances focus the attention of decision makers on specific 
performance aspiration (Greve, 2008). Aspiration can also be set by the strategic intent of the 
organisation (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989).  
Simultaneously, the processes involved in searching are governed by organisational 
routines which are built on past experiences i.e. path dependent. As a result of the cycle of 
aspirations, performance, and problemistic search the organisation builds capabilities by 
adopting new routines in response to how the decision makers’ attention is focused on certain 
priorities more than others. In such a context, we propose that the introduction of structural 
constraints will focus the attention of decision makers on internal routines and guide the 
adoption of routines in line with the structural constraints that set priorities. Therefore 
structural constraints influence organisational choices in adopting routines.  
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1.3 ROUTINES IN EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS  
In An evolutionary theory of economic change, Nelson and Winter (1982) bring the concept 
of organisational routines i.e. firm specific, path dependent, repeated patterns of collective 
behaviour to the forefront of the discussion on organisational capabilities. They define 
capabilities as the “range of things a firm can do at any time” (52) and propose that 
organisational routines that build capabilities, include characteristics “that range from well-
specified technical routines for producing things, through procedures for hiring and firing, 
ordering new inventory, or stepping up production of items in high demand, to policies 
regarding investments, research and development (R&D) or advertising, and business 
strategies about product diversification and overseas investment” (14).  
They go on to categorize routines as those that are related to knowing the answer to 
‘how to do’ questions (e.g., production or implementation) and those related to knowing the 
answers to ‘how to choose’ questions (e.g., deliberation or planning). Even though Nelson 
and Winter note the conceptual distinction between routines that make up the ‘choice set’ and 
‘choosing’ i.e. between the availability of different production techniques and deciding to 
adopt a production technique, they see strong similarities between the two categories and 
treat them similarly.  
In this dissertation we propose that this distinction between routines that make up the 
‘choice set’ and routines that involve ‘choosing’, is a useful one and needs to be explored 
further. Specifically, we argue that the act of choosing an option from the choice set is 
essentially a behavioural act and is subject to the decision makers’ cognitive limitations. How 
a decision maker chooses what to do, is influenced by mechanisms that firms use to focus and 
distribute the attention of its decision makers (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). This 
calls for a closer look into the causal influence between the availability of capabilities and the 
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performance of firms at the macro-level, by investigating the micro-level choices made by 
decision makers under the influence of attention-focusing mechanisms i.e. structural 
constraints. 
 
1.4 A FRAMEWORK TO STUDY ADOPTION OF ROUTINES UNDER CONSTRAINTS 
Our aim is to build on the attention-based perspective of strategy formulation and contribute 
to the discussion connecting the macro- and micro-perspectives on strategy and strategic 
decision making. Coleman (1994) provides an excellent basis to build the theoretical links 
between the macro- and micro-level of analyses. In his book Foundations of Social Theory, 
he summarizes the relation in a diagram (adaptation in fig 1.1) where the macro variables are 
at the top and the micro actions are at the bottom while the arrows indicate possible pathways 
of causal influence between the two level (Coleman, 1994: 10). This conceptualization, often 
referred to as "Coleman's boat", very elegantly captures the ‘structural constraints’ that we 
refer to as attention-focusing mechanisms and its influence on micro-level choices.  
Coleman illustrates this idea of the influence of structural constraints with a 
simulation game. The game comprises of, “a set of roles that players take on, each role 
defining the interests or goals of the player, rules about the kinds of actions that are allowable 
for players in each role, as well as about the order of play, rules specifying the consequences 
that each player's action has for other players in the game.” He goes on to argue that, “it is 
this structure which corresponds to the two transitions I have described: macro to micro and 
micro to macro. The first of these transitions is mirrored in the player's interests, given by the 
goal established by the rules; the constraints on action, which are imposed by other rules; the 
initial conditions, which provide the context within which action is taken; and after the game 
is in play, the new context imposed by others' actions. The second transition is mirrored by 
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the consequences of the player's action: how it combines with, interferes with, or in any other 
way interacts with the actions of other ... thus creating a new context within which the next 
action takes place.” (11-12).  
 
Fig 1.1: Theorizing causal pathways that link macro-level variables through micro-level 
action under attention focusing constraints  (Coleman, 1994) 
 
Put differently, if we assume that the availability of capabilities lead to firm 
performance though the micro-level choices of decision makers then the micro-level process 
can be broken down into at least three steps. First, the act of representing the opportunity that 
is open to variation in representation based on structural constraints that operate as attention-
focusing mechanisms i.e. path B, second, the act of selecting an option to maximize expected 
utility i.e. path C, and finally, performance as observed at the macro-level is then the result of 
the aggregation of results from choices made at the micro-level i.e. path D. The underlying 
argument is that all attentions-focusing mechanisms impose cognitive limitation on the 
decision maker’s ability to represent opportunities or threats. This step of how an opportunity 
or a problem is framed (or not framed) imposes boundaries on the subsequent process of 
choosing routines. Performance outcome is therefore not just a matter of availability of 
resources and capabilities (path A), but it is also influenced by the decision makers’ 
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commitment of resources and capabilities to various tasks, based on how their attention is 
focused on some opportunities more than others (path B   C  D). In this dissertation we 
will ask questions about the path B   C  D as depicted in Fig 1.1. 
In the dissertation we use micro and macro to designate the relative unit of analysis is 
each essay. The first essay deals with the macro-micro interaction. In this essay 
organisational mandates operate at the macro-level and influence the choices of adopting 
absorptive capacity routines at the micro- level. Here macro is the level of the R&D 
subsidiary whereas micro is the level of the inventor. The second essay deals with the micro-
micro interaction. In this essay competitive pressure focuses the attention of decision makers 
to trigger search for better routines. Here micro is the level of the team. Finally the third 
essay deals with the micro-macro interaction In this essay micro-level choices to adopt a new 
routine are made by decision makers based on how their attention is focused by the adoption 
decision of other firms when engaged in multipoint competition. We observe the diffusion of 
a routine as a competitive action at the macro-level. Here micro is the level of the key 
decision maker in the firm and macro is the level of the industry. We will provide more 
details on the essays in section 1.7.   
 
1.5 BOUNDARY CONDITIONS OF THE STUDY  
Before we introduce the three essays, each employing a distinct methodological approach, on 
adoption of organisational routines, let us briefly outline the boundary conditions within 
which we propose this study. We define organisational routines as firm specific, path 
dependent, repeated patterns of collective behaviour that provide an organisation the potential 
to undertake an activity. Routines have been the subject of many excellent review articles and 
a handbook (e.g. (Becker, 2004, 2008; Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011),  therefore we 
24 
 
do not attempt to do another review on the subject; instead we will highlight the salient 
arguments separately in the literature review for each essay. However, given the wide variety 
of contexts in which routines have been studied, it is still useful to point out the three main 
boundary conditions of our study. First, we study organisational routines as opposed to 
individual routines. Second, we study the organisational routines embedded in the context of 
the task, the firm, or the industry and third, we focus on the adoption of routines as opposed 
to changes in the routine itself.  
Organisational routines are distinct from individual routines. Our interest here is in 
organisational routines as opposed to routines of specific individuals or an individual’s 
adoption of routines8. Organisational routines involve the collective activities of a team or 
sets of teams typically within or across functional areas. These organisational routines serve 
as mechanisms to control and coordinate actions between multiple actors while performing an 
activity (for a detailed review see Becker (2004)). Specifically we are interested in the use of 
organisational routines as rules, or procedures that are executed in carrying out particular 
objectives like a production task. In the processual sense organisational routines consist of a 
series of steps to carry out a task. Similar terms used in the literature include standard 
practices, blueprints, decision-rules, or standard operating procedures for executing an 
activity (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011).  
Next, in line with prior studies in the capabilities tradition, we study organisational 
routines specific to a context (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Teece & 
Pisano, 1994). The argument for specificity is often used along multiple dimensions of which 
we would like to mention two i.e. task and firm/industry specificity. First, somewhat 
obviously, routines are specific to the context of the task or activities that they are designed to 
                                                             
8
 For example individual routines would consist of heuristics or habits of individuals in 
decision making. 
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accomplish. For example routines are often designed and practiced to build absorptive 
capacity in organisations (Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2011). These routines require 
coordination between multiple actors across different organisational units with the objective 
of building firm level absorptive capacity i.e. the capability to evaluate the benefits that can 
be derived from external technological and market forces (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Routines are also specific to the organisation or industry context within which they are 
designed. For example, every organisation has its own way of implementing the routines to 
build absorptive capacity (Peeters, Massini, & Lewin, 2014) or particular set of routines may 
be specific to certain industries (e.g. TQM in manufacturing). We will discuss the need for 
context specificity in each essay separately.    
 Finally, our focus would be primarily on the decision to adopt an organisational 
routine as opposed to study the changes in the organisational routines. To that extent we treat 
the routines (or collection of routines) as constant over time. Throughout the three essays we 
are mindful that a routine may adapt with time, experience and learning (Argote, 2013) but 
we still make this simplifying assumption as any change in a routine is still a function of its 
previous state i.e. it is path dependent (Cohen et al., 1996; Levitt & March, 1988)9.  
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE ESSAYS  
Each essay deals with a structural constraint that focuses the attention of decision makers on 
adopting routines. In the first essay – Adoption of absorptive capacity routines and 
technological innovation: Evidence from a global R&D organisation, we examine how 
                                                             
9
 There is a rich tradition of scholarly work that deals with the changes in organisational 
routines from a practice perspective. For instance, scholars in this tradition have focused on 
understanding the role of agency and artefacts in influencing changes in routine. See 
Parmigiani, A., & Howard-Grenville, J. 2011. Routines revisited: Exploring the capabilities 
and practice perspectives. The Academy of Management Annals, 5(1): 413-453. for a 
contrast between the capabilities and practice perspectives. 
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corporate innovation strategy influences the adoption of Absorptive Capacity (AC) routines 
in different subsidiaries of a large global software R&D organisation. We argue that the 
innovation strategy based on dominant logic stipulates exploitative or explorative mandates 
to R&D subsidiaries that focus the attention of managers on some innovation opportunities 
more than others. We theorise that adopting an AC routine would increase or decrease the 
subsidiary’s innovative output, depending on whether the AC routine is aligned or misaligned 
with the subsidiary’s mandate. We test this idea using data collected from SAP, a global 
packaged-software firm with 14 international R&D subsidiaries that implemented six major 
AC routines from 2000 to 2010. We find that while the R&D organisation as a whole benefits 
from the introduction of AC routines, individual R&D subsidiaries benefit more when AC 
routines are aligned with its mandate and there is a fall in the subsidiary’s innovative output 
when the AC routines are misaligned with its mandate. The results from this study gives us 
some insight into how managers at the level of an R&D subsidiary select routines, but it also 
opens up a relatively more micro-level question i.e. what triggers decision makers to search 
for new routines in the first place?  
At the micro-level choices made by decision makers become routinized over time and 
form the basis of predictable patterns, or ‘production techniques’. The use of routines in 
decision-making helps agents to economize on cognitive effort of searching, and focus their 
attention on productivity gains from increased labour effort by using the same production 
techniques. However, in reality these production techniques are not static, but new production 
techniques are always being invented by the variation, selection, and retention of underlying 
routines by decision makers in response to new problems (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Decision 
makers often confront new problems when there is a ‘mismatch’ between available resources 
and desired outcome. These circumstances arise when organisations face reduced resource 
availability, for instance due to external supply shock, or a shift in desired outcome that may 
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be among other things due to new regulations or changing competitive conditions. Under 
these circumstances, decision makers are often forced to choose between lowering their 
aspiration and rethinking their existing routines.   
In the second essay – Ingenuity and the creation of new routines: Evidence from 
laboratory experiments, we look at the latter option. Specifically, we argue that when 
decision makers work under structural constraints, that neither allow them to obtain more 
resources, nor compromise on their aspiration, they will turn their attention to internal 
production and management processes. This focussing of attention on internal processes may 
result in attempts to pressure employees to economize on the use of existing resources or 
accelerate production processes. In some situations, employees may push hard to meet these 
targets without questioning existing methods and practices (i.e. apply more labour effort), but 
in others their observation and analysis of production processes may lead them to ‘see’ better 
ways of arriving at the desired targets (i.e. apply cognitive effort to search). Such insights are 
often at the origins of new practices and our aim is to understand what triggers some decision 
makers to search for better routines.  
We theorize at the micro-level high aspiration under resource constraints focus the 
attention of agents to search for new and better routines to improve productivity. We argue 
that under normal conditions, an agent’s familiarity with the routines of a task, helps them to 
economize on the cognitive effort of search and focus attention on performance improvement 
through labour effort when such labour effort is available i.e. apply more resources using 
known techniques. However, under sufficiently high aspiration and resource constraints, the 
routines can be rendered ineffective, thereby framing agents to search for better routines 
through cognitive effort. We design two experiments to test the relationship between high 
aspiration and performance through the increase in labour effort (apply known solutions) and 
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cognitive effort (search for new solutions) in repeated task and a novel task. Our results show 
that agents are more likely to discover new routines under high aspiration and resource 
constraints. 
In the third essay – Choosing which battles to fight:  An attention-based argument 
for the diffusion of routines as a competitive action, we pick-up on the micro to macro 
transition i.e. what drives the diffusion of a routine? We know that a routine diffuses in a 
population as decision makers have access to information about the benefits of the routine 
and have the resources necessary to adopt the routine. We theorize that as firms engage in 
competition across multiple markets and business domains, they allocate more attention to 
the information from some competitors more than others. Put differently, a firm is likely to 
allocate more attention to the decisions of its primary competitor than to the same decision 
made by a firm that is not a major competitor. Based on this argument, we build an agent-
based simulation model to estimate how an attention-based mechanism would govern the 
adoption of routines as a competitive response to rivals’ decisions to adopt or not adopt new 
routines in an industry. Using this model, we predict the characteristics of early adopters in a 
diffusion pattern. We illustrate this theory using data from the adoption of Software-as-a-
Service amongst the top 50 global packaged software firms between 2002 and 2012. Table 
1.3 summarizes the research questions, the methods and data, key findings, and the 
theoretical implications from each essay.  
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Table 1.1 Overview of the three essays 
Essay Research question  Data & methods Key findings Theoretical implications 
1. Adoption of 
absorptive 
capacity (AC) 
routines and 
technological 
innovation: 
Evidence from a 
global R&D 
organisation 
Does organisational 
mandate influence the 
adoption and 
effectiveness of 
absorptive capacity 
routines in corporate 
R&D units? 
Quantitative analysis on 
panel data (2000 – 2010) 
collected from 14 global 
R&D subsidiaries of a 
single large MNC in the 
packaged-software 
industry  
(i) Technological innovation is 
positively related with the introduction 
of AC routines 
(ii) R&D subsidiaries benefit when 
AC routines are aligned with the 
innovation mandate, but there is a fall 
in the subsidiary’s innovative output 
when the AC routines are misaligned 
with the mandate 
(i) Organisational mandates 
influence micro-level 
choices in adopting and 
benefitting from AC routines 
(ii) Research in global R&D 
needs to be more cognizant 
of variation in location 
mandates   
2. Ingenuity and 
the creation of 
new routines: 
Evidence from 
laboratory 
experiments  
Does high aspiration 
under resource 
constraints induce 
agents to apply 
increased cognitive 
effort to search for 
better routines to 
improve performance? 
Laboratory experiments 
in teams using a:  
(i) repeated task 
(ii) novel task 
Where aspiration is 
manipulated using 
competitive pressures 
(i) Agents show a preference to 
improve performance though 
increased labour effort under low 
aspiration.  
(ii) High aspiration under constraints 
can trigger increased cognitive effort 
when labour effort is not sufficient to 
meet high aspiration  
(i) Competitive pressure 
under resources constraints 
focus attention of decision 
makers on search for better 
routines 
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3. Choosing 
which battles to 
fight:  An 
attention-based 
argument for the 
diffusion of 
routines as a 
competitive 
action 
Does an attention-based 
model explain the 
diffusion of a routine as 
a competitive action 
when firms are engaged 
in multipoint 
competition?  
What would be the 
characteristics of the 
early adopters of 
routines in such a 
system? 
Agent-based simulation 
model to estimate 
diffusion pattern of 
routines. Illustration of 
the pattern using data 
from the adoption of 
SaaS as a new software 
delivery capability 
amongst the top 50 
packaged software firms 
between 2002 and 2012   
(i) Early adopters of a new routine are 
more likely to be firms with a small 
reference group and high competitive 
rivalry  
(ii) Firms with large reference groups 
and low competitive rivalry are least 
likely to be early adopters 
(i) Firms engaged in 
multipoint competition 
prioritize their competitive 
response based on how their 
attention is focused by the 
moves of competitors   
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2. ADOPTION OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY ROUTINES AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM A GLOBAL R&D ORGANISATION 
 
Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can 
find information upon it. 
- Samuel Johnson  
From Boswell’s “The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D” (1791) 
 
This essay looks at how corporate innovation strategy influences the effectiveness of 
Absorptive Capacity (AC) routines by the formulation of an innovation strategy based on 
dominant logic that stipulates the allocation of exploitative or explorative mandates to R&D 
subsidiaries. Extant AC research suggests that maintaining a successful innovation strategy 
calls for striking a balance between inward- and outward-looking AC routines. In this essay 
we argue that adopting an AC routine would increase or decrease the subsidiary’s innovative 
output, depending on whether the AC routine is aligned or misaligned with the subsidiary’s 
mandate. We test this using data collected from SAP, a global packaged-software firm with 
14 international R&D subsidiaries that implemented six major AC routines from 2000 to 
2010. We find that R&D subsidiaries benefit when AC routines are aligned with the mandate, 
but there is a fall in the subsidiary’s innovative output when the AC routines are misaligned 
with the mandate. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Lewin et al. (2011) contend that in the twenty years that followed the introduction of 
‘absorptive capacity’ (AC) by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), this seminal construct has been 
widely applied, but not fully understood. The main problem, argue Lewin et al. (2011: 81), is 
that, “with very few exceptions, the specific organisational routines and processes that 
constitute AC capabilities remain a black box”.  A number of researchers suggest that 
opening the black box is best accomplished by placing AC within the wider framework of 
evolutionary economics as originally pioneered by Nelson and Winter (1982). As with other 
models in organisation theory that adopt this paradigm, the evolution of AC at the macro-
level is the result of variation, selection, and retention of routines at the micro-level. To base 
AC development on the dynamics of routines at the micro-level, however, raises the question 
of path dependence. If AC development is a function of the evolution of routines, then the 
shape that AC takes over time will be strongly influenced by prior problems and 
opportunities that organisations encounter as they search for knowledge that can be 
transformed into commercial innovations (Zahra & George, 2002).     
If AC is path dependent then organisations run the risk of possessing an AC that 
underperforms when the environment changes. Put differently, search routines that are 
modified or selected out in response to idiosyncratic problems, associated with innovating at 
one point in time, may actually reduce the effectiveness of AC when the organisation 
confronts opportunities that are unfamiliar and uncertain. To counter this trend, organisations 
work to align their AC development with overall R&D strategy. Ensuring this alignment can 
be challenging. In most organisations, R&D strategy consists of policies that top managers 
set for the various departments or business units. However, while policies that make up R&D 
strategy consist of intentions, plans, targets, and budgets that are explicitly laid out, routines 
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in contrast, are decision rules, standard operating procedures, and norms that are consciously 
followed at the micro-level (Becker, 2004; Lewin et al., 2011). Inevitably, there is a gap 
between the macro framework where R&D strategy is formulated, and the complex set of 
routines that make up AC. The question that we wish to address in this essay is how the two 
levels interact? More specifically, what impact does R&D strategy, as articulated by the top 
management team, have on the routines that make AC? 
We start with a review of routine-based view of AC with particular emphasis on the 
role of internal vs. external AC routines. We then examine how firms use ‘mandates’ to direct 
the activities of their R&D units. We argue that the constraints of directing the operations of 
R&D in detail often lead managers to rely on ‘dominant logic’, which aligns the attention of 
managers with the firm’s R&D objectives. This in turn suggests that AC routines that are not 
aligned with the mandate of the unit will either have no impact or even have a negative 
impact on the unit’s R&D output. We then introduce our research site, SAP, a global 
packaged-software producer with more than US$15 billion in revenues as of 2010 (end of the 
study period). Like most large technology firms, R&D at SAP is globalised and managed out 
of 14 international R&D subsidiaries. Using the subsidiary as the unit of analysis, we develop 
and test four hypotheses on the interaction of AC routines and organisational mandates on the 
subsidiary’s innovative output. We conclude by drawing implications for theory, practice, 
and future directions of research.  
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2.2 THEORY 
2.2.1 ROUTINE-BASED VIEW OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
Technological innovation is at the heart of growth and renewal of firms in R&D intensive 
industries (Dosi, 1988). Levinthal and March (1993) argue that technological innovations 
entail organisational innovation search processes which are triggered when an organisation’s 
performance falls short of its aspiration (Cyert & March, 1963). Complementing this view, 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that search processes are not only triggered by 
retrospective assessment of firm performance, but they are also activated by perceived 
opportunities. Opportunity perception, however, depends on the capacity of the organisation 
to evaluate the benefits that can be derived from external technological and market forces. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) called this ‘absorptive capacity’. They argued that this capability 
has two distinct dimensions: ‘outward-looking’, AC that enables the capture of external 
knowledge, and ‘inward-looking’, AC that enables organisations to assimilate knowledge 
from other units within the organisation.   
Although AC as a construct was rapidly and widely adopted by organisational 
researchers, questions remained about how organisations constitute AC in the first place. 
Increasingly, scholars argue that as is the case for capabilities more generally, AC also 
consists of organisational routines (Zahra & George, 2002). Mirroring Cohen and Levinthal’s 
breakdown of AC into ‘inward-looking’ and ‘outward-looking’ processes, Lewin et al. (2011) 
propose two distinct types of routines, namely internal and external AC routines. According 
to Lewin et al. (2011) internal AC routines relate to the efficiency of internal communication 
and sharing of knowledge originating from other units within the firm. For example, many 
technology firms run so called ‘Jam sessions’ where individuals and teams from different 
units of the firm come together for a few days either physically i.e. in the same location, or 
35 
 
virtually i.e. over online video conferencing, to work on specific predefined ideas or ideas 
that they find interesting beyond their daily tasks. This is a typical internal AC routine that 
facilitates communication between different parts of the firm, thus enabling employees to 
share current challenges, cross pollinate ideas and solutions, and encourage management to 
focus attention and resources on promising innovative ideas. IBM introduced a similar 
internal AC routine of ‘Jamming’ in 2001, designed for its own specific context and 
priorities. In their case study of IBM’s Jams, Bjelland and Wood (2008) note that in the 2006 
Jam edition, which was a three-day virtual mega-event involving employees across all R&D 
subsidiaries, IBM was able to harvest ten new business ideas that cut across existing 
businesses. They also note that the IBM Jam process helped IBM innovate by identifying 
numerous smaller ideas (from its own employees) which complement bigger ones.  
In contrast to internal AC routines, external AC routines target external knowledge 
that may be useful to the organisation. For instance, a common practice in many technology 
firms is to seek R&D alliances or co-development partnerships with firms in closely related 
industries. Such collaborations often lead to sharing knowledge and best practices that enable 
partners to learn from each other and even co-develop new products or services. Sony, which 
has formed various alliances since the 1990s, is one such firm. Inkpen and Dinur (1998) note 
that starting in 1990s Sony’s management team forged new technology linkages with various 
computer and telecommunications firms. These linkages enabled Sony engineers, who 
already had considerable experience in consumer electronics, to access new external 
knowledge, in particular techniques to manage faster product development cycles, which at 
that time were more advanced in the computer industry. At Sony, the practice of alliance 
formation was not confined to a few experts, but involved individuals and teams across 
various organisational levels who engaged directly with partners. Sony clearly benefitted 
from these early alliances, as is evident from its own subsequent entry into personal 
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computers, notably the launch of the VAIO in 1996, and subsequently its entry into mobile 
communications via a joint venture with Ericsson in 2001.  
Though partners are a key source of external knowledge through relationships like 
joint ventures and alliances (Dyer & Singh, 1998), collaborations with ‘lead users’ (Von 
Hippel, 1986), and customers (Foss, Laursen, & Pedersen, 2011) can also be sources of 
external knowledge. For instance, Foss et al. (2011) point out that firms develop AC by 
tapping user and customer knowledge. This is often done by introducing external AC 
routines, such as periodic interactions with customer that are designed to capture new 
knowledge that is shared with other units in the organisation.   
To sum up, AC research argues that firms build ‘inward-looking’ AC by introducing 
internal AC routines, and build ‘outward-looking’ AC by introducing external AC routines. 
Since useful knowledge can be found both internally and externally, both inward- and 
outward-looking AC are potentially valuable for technological innovation, it is therefore to be 
inferred that both internal and external AC routines are necessary to develop AC capabilities.  
 
2.2.2 BALANCING INWARD- AND OUTWARD-LOOKING ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY  
Although AC can be expected to have both inward- and outward-looking AC routines, the 
question remains, how far should organisations cultivate one or the other? Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) argue that that there is a trade-off between developing inward- and outward-
looking AC. Organisations that pursue the advantages of inward-looking AC do so at the 
expense of outward-looking AC, and vice versa, organisations that tilt towards outward-
looking AC do so at the expense of inward-looking AC. Pushed too far this may result in 
excessive dominance by inward- or outward-looking AC that is dysfunctional. The 
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implication is that firms do best when they achieve a balance between inward- and outward-
looking AC. At the micro-level this suggests that allowing internal AC routines to dominate 
is more conducive to systematic exploitation of internal knowledge, but may come at the 
expense of external knowledge acquisition that often plays a vital role in new exploratory 
innovations. Likewise, allowing external AC routines to dominate may lead organisations to 
overlook useful knowledge that is available internally, resulting in costly ‘reinvention of the 
wheel’. 
 The conclusion that most researchers have drawn from the limits imposed by the 
trade-off between internal and external AC, is that a coordinated balance between the two 
ensures optimal search and knowledge acquisition by the organisation (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Lewin et al., 2011; Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010). As organisations grow, product 
lines evolve, and competition shifts, the relative balance between internal and external AC 
will change. This change may be caused by a push to innovate certain technologies, the need 
to generate additional earnings, or may simply be a product of incremental decisions at the 
departmental and business levels. To maintain a balance between internal and external AC, 
and to counter a drift towards excessive emphasis towards one type of AC at the expense of 
the other, top managers will usually develop policies that directly or indirectly seek to 
maintain the relative influence of internal vs. external AC search routines.     
 
2.2.3 R&D MANDATE AS DOMINANT LOGIC 
Research suggests that successful corporate R&D strategy depends on developing effective 
search processes. However, as Laursen (2012) points out, the literature on innovation does 
not subscribe to a single effective search process. Instead, it draws a distinction between 
‘local’ and ‘non-local’ search processes, ‘search depth’ and ‘search scope’ (Katila & Ahuja, 
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2002), and between ‘organisational boundary-spanning’ and ‘technological boundary-
spanning’ (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001).  At heart, argue Laursen (2012), all these distinctions 
address essentially the same opposing tendencies that March (1991) captures in the 
distinction between exploitative and explorative search. The basic innovation dilemma that 
confronts organisation is how to balance the need to efficiently ‘exploit’ existing knowledge, 
while at the same time ‘explore’ innovations in conjunction with new market opportunities. 
Benner and Tushman (2003) propose that firms achieve this by distinguishing between 
exploitative and explorative R&D efforts. These efforts are directed by policy mandates that 
are formulated at the corporate level. As Benner and Tushman (2003) put it, exploitative 
mandate focus R&D efforts on existing technological trajectories with a view to improving 
products that are already in the firm’s portfolio. In contrast, explorative mandate directs R&D 
efforts towards a search for different technological trajectories, and potentially radically 
innovative products, by accessing new external knowledge. The literature on organisational 
ambidexterity builds on this aspect further (Duncan, 1976; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & 
Tushman, 2009). This stream of literature points out that both exploration and exploitation 
jointly influence firm’s performance in technological innovation (He & Wong, 2004; Hill & 
Birkinshaw, 2008).  
 A mandate for a particular kind of R&D effort is intended to link the organisation’s 
R&D objectives with activities of the business unit or department that is responsible for 
implementing these objectives. The key challenge facing the organisation is ensuring that 
mandates influence R&D activities on a day-to-day basis. The difficulty arises from the 
relationship between top managers as strategic decision makers and R&D actors, who usually 
work several levels below in specialized units. While top managers seek to maintain control 
over defining R&D objectives, effective implementation of these objectives depends on 
allowing managers that are involved in managing the R&D effort considerable latitude when 
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it comes to deciding how they should proceed. The problem that confronts top managers is 
how to ensure that R&D managers remain focused on the direction set by the mandate 
without controlling the process directly?  
 Looking at this problem more broadly in terms of the balance between corporate 
control and entrepreneurial flexibility led Bettis and Prahalad (1995) to suggest that 
corporations often achieve a balance between top-down direction and bottom-up initiative by 
creating what they describe as ‘dominant logic’: A shared cognitive framework that shapes 
assumptions and focuses attention on priorities. Dominant logic operates by structuring the 
business units’ attention processes (Ocasio, 1997). In practice, this means that business unit’s 
managers are expected to focus more attention on certain market or technological 
opportunities than others. The differential allocation of attention has two main consequences. 
In the short run, dominant logic should drive managers to filter out data that is considered as 
less ‘relevant’, and pay more attention to data that is consistent with dominant logic. In the 
long run, however, differential attention will also impact the search routines that managers 
use to gather and analyse data. In other words, business unit activities are more likely to use, 
elaborate, and improve search routines that are consistent with the dominant logic. In 
contrast, search routines that are not consistent with the dominant logic are less likely to be 
useful, and therefore more likely to be side-lined or discarded over time. Our intent in the 
paper is not to investigate how the dominant logic is created but instead focus on what is the 
dominant logic by which exploration or exploitation mandates exist at each R&D subsidiary.   
To sum up, on the one hand, R&D mandates link the organisation’s R&D strategy, as 
formulated by top managers with the objectives at the business unit level. This dominant 
logic of assigning certain types of mandates to the business units is influenced by the shared 
cognition of local resource endowments, local conditions, and idiosyncratic business unit 
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contingencies. While on the other hand, managers at the business unit level work within an 
ensemble of AC routines that build different dimensions of AC. Inevitably, the dominant 
logic as set by top management, will be aligned with some of these AC dimensions, and 
misaligned with others. When corporations comprise multi-business units, and each unit is 
influenced by local conditions, what impact does alignment or misalignment of R&D 
dominant logic with AC routines have on innovative performance of each of these business 
units? 
 
2.3 RESEARCH CONTEXT FOR THE STUDY OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY ROUTINES  
Many scholars have pointed out that routines that build AC are unique, context specific and 
embedded in the organisation (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; 
Winter & Szulanski, 2001). Therefore, to study the impact of R&D mandate on the adoption 
and effectiveness of the same routine, we use data from multiple R&D subsidiaries of a single 
large packaged-software firm, SAP. Our choice of the firm was dictated to some extent by 
access to top management and the firm’s willingness to make internal information available 
for research. Confining our data to one firm limits the generalizability of our findings, but it 
also has important advantages. To begin with, SAP operates in a single global industry i.e. it 
operates only in the packaged-software industry. Consequently, all of SAP’s 14 R&D 
subsidiaries are focused on packaged-software development and maintenance. Having one 
firm where all R&D subsidiaries are focused on the same technology ensures that that we are 
looking at the same set of internal and external AC routines across units. We can track the 
introduction and diffusion of these routines, and examine how they interact with the mandates 
of different subsidiaries. The longitudinal design that we are adopting allows us to compare 
how mandates influence adoption and effectiveness of internal and external AC routines. This 
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means that our focus is deeper than previous research in this area, as we aim to understand 
the nature and impact of the same AC routine in different organisational units.      
When it comes to allocating R&D investments to subsidiaries, we argue that top 
managers will set an R&D mandate and allocate resources to R&D locations based on the 
perceived strengths of the subsidiary. In the case of SAP, an overview of the R&D strategy 
reveals that the company essentially had two mandates for R&D investments, in line with the 
typology proposed by Benner and Tushman (2003). The R&D investments to subsidiaries 
were either directed towards extending or maintaining existing products and technologies, i.e. 
they were given an exploitative mandate, or they were directed to develop new products and 
technologies, i.e. they were given an explorative mandate. In the next section we will briefly 
review the creation of SAP’s R&D organisation.  
 
2.3.1 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SAP’S R&D ORGANISATION 
SAP is the world’s largest producer of business software. Founded in 1972 in Mannheim, 
Germany, SAP had more than 53,000 employees in over 120 countries as of 2010. In that 
year, the company reported gross revenues of over US$15 billion. Since its establishment, 
SAP has built a large network of software development locations around the world. These 
R&D centres called ‘labs’ employ more than 20,000 of SAP’s R&D staff. In this section we 
will summarize the evolution of the R&D organisation in three phases, last of which is our 
study period.  
Phase 1 Initial years till mid 1990s: Since SAP Labs Network organisation has a close 
association with SAP’s growth and product history, we start with SAP product history. SAP, 
an acronym for Systemanalyse und Programmementwicklung ("System Analysis and 
42 
 
Programme Development") was founded by five software engineers from IBM, Germany. 
They saw an opportunity to build standardized ‘real-time’ business software for functions like 
finance and manufacturing, and in 1973 they released a financial accounting system that later 
formed the backbone of the flagship product called R1. Developed by a handful of software 
engineers (less than 25) in Mannheim, Germany, the product was still highly malleable to 
what the customer needed. Most of the developers were in constant contact with customer 
and were involved in sales as well. All the customers were European, and mostly German.  
The next release SAP R/2 System in 1982 was not only a stable product it was also 
compatible with both the IBM and Siemens mainframes. This made the system readily 
acceptable in the market. Development was still quite small and limited to Germany but SAP 
had started attracting customers from all around the world and many from the US. By 1985, 
the US business had become so large that SAP set up a US sales headquarters in Wayne, 
Pennsylvania. By 1991, SAP had more than 2,200 customers across 31 countries including 
Japan, while the core development work was still done in Germany. If a piece of custom 
development was needed, developers from Germany would travel to the customer location. 
While this may seem inefficient, by keeping all the development in one location, SAP was 
able to create a tight coupling in the initial years, which was essential to build a stable core 
technology. The development organisation had also become formalized i.e. they were now 
separate from the sales set up. Developers would only interact with customers in highly 
specialised custom development projects or in requirements gathering stages.  
 The inflection point came in 1992 with the introduction of the SAP R/3 system based 
on client-server technology. This was a significant evolution from the age of R/2 based on 
mainframes and called for more and more network functionality from customers. The 
relatively small development team entirely based in Germany, was not only stretched but at 
43 
 
the same time somewhat cut off from innovations in the technology industry coming out of 
the Silicon Valley in the US. On the one hand European IT hardware vendors like Nixdorf 
were disappearing, while on the other hand Silicon Valley based firms like Intel, Microsoft 
and Oracle were beginning to dominate the technology world. It was clear that SAP needed to 
get external knowledge and expand its development force to meet these demands.   
In 1993, SAP started its cooperation with Microsoft (the largest software producer 
then) to port the R/3 system to Windows NT. This collaboration was the first of its kind and 
also marked the setting up of a small but permanent facility in the Silicon Valley. The aim 
was clearly to create a doorway to let all the new technologies from the Silicon Valley into 
SAP. Even though the facility at Silicon Valley was a move towards a distributed setup, it 
was still a tightly coupled extension through which SAP could enhance the core being 
developed in Walldorf, Germany. 
The opening of the Lab in US was also a sign of stronger commitment to the 
American market and soon enough large American firms responded positively to SAP. For 
example in 1994, when the R/3 System was released on Windows NT, IBM (a long standing 
SAP partner) decided to roll out R/3 globally, making IBM the then single largest SAP 
customer. From an organisational perspective, the expansion of development to US was 
driven by the sponsorship of one of the founders, Hasso Plattner. As Neumann and Srinivasan 
(2009) note, the initial ‘seed’ resources came from Germany and Hasso had to convince them 
to move. Hasso himself started spending considerable lengths of time in the Valley to set up 
the lab. The initial years were tough. It was not only an uphill task to get critical mass of 
experienced SAP developers in the Lab to do meaningful collaborative work but back in the 
headquarters at Walldorf, Germany, managers had to fight the perception that all the ‘cool’ 
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development would move to the Valley while the ‘old’ maintenance work would remain in 
Germany.    
To summarize, in this period we find that SAP’s development team was small and 
concentrated in Germany. The R&D organisation was flat and had started to get specialised 
only in custom development work as specialised sales teams had started coming up in key 
markets. Towards the end of this phase, the board of SAP started realising the need to 
globalise their R&D to (a) integrate latest technology innovations from different regions, (b) 
move development closer to the growing markets, and (c) source the best developers in larger 
numbers from around the world. 
Phase 2 Emergence of the Hub & Spoke model till 2000: SAP has been consciously 
building the Global Labs Network since 1996 (SAP, 2004, p: 32). Before that SAP had made 
strategic investments in R&D only in the Silicon Valley, US. From these early experiences, 
the management team realised that some fundamental questions needed to be answered 
around the management of distributed software development. These questions were on three 
levels: (a) Content: What would be developed in each lab? (b) Process: How will it come 
together as one? (c) Organisation: How will it be managed? These questions reflect the 
management team’s thinking around setting up mandates for each subsidiary and the 
accompanying routines that would help connect each subsidiary in a network. 
By 1998, SAP had made investments in other key industrial regions outside of Europe 
like Detroit in the US, Tokyo in Japan and Bangalore in India (SAP, 1998, p: 43 ). While the 
purpose of the lab in Tokyo was clearly oriented towards targeting the Japanese market, the 
reason for the lab in Bangalore in 1998 was to tap into the Indian talent market (Neumann & 
Srinivasan, 2009, p: 28). Not surprisingly these locations have significantly evolved from the 
initial design. In fact, by 2006 SAP had focused the work at the Tokyo facility only on 
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custom development for specific customers or partner oriented projects as opposed to core 
product development (SAP, 2007, p: 31), whereas with the growth in the Indian information 
technology services industry SAP set up the Co-Innovation Lab (COIL) in Bangalore to 
increase the collaboration with Indian services partners (SAP, 2009) under the umbrella of 
the existing development Lab that was also doing product maintenance projects.  
In this phase the SAP Labs network cautiously increased its footprint to Moscow, 
Tokyo, Bangalore, Sofia-Antipolis and key locations in the US apart from Palo Alto. All 
these centres were small and served somewhat different organisational needs. At the same 
time the SAP was also firming up its distributed development practices around content, 
process and organisation.  
In 1998 a board sponsored SAP Labs project recommended a ‘Hub & Spoke’ model 
for content management. SAP development in Walldorf would remain the main development 
hub and delegate responsibilities to other labs around the world. Each lab would develop a 
specialty around a research lab, development centre, ABAP factory (ABAP is the SAP 
proprietary coding language) or a test centre. Each lab was also assigned a board sponsor to 
ensure executive sponsorship for the location. The minimum number of developers in a 
location for it to be viable was estimated to be 100 with an ideal manager to developer ratio 
of 1:10. 
From a process perspective, in the mid-1990s, SAP introduced a formal software 
development framework called HORIZON. This focused on the core development process 
from specification gathering to testing. Responding to the growing need of 
internationalization of the product, the next process evolution was the Solution Development 
Lifecycle (SDLC), which included product level planning and processes to support market 
introduction. The SDLC was introduced in 2000. These detailed process guidelines while on 
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the one hand increased the bureaucracy in the development process but at the same time 
created the much needed standardisation to run a globally distributed development network.    
The organisational setup relied heavily on the early experiences in the US. Apart from 
the development teams (Lines of Business), each lab location has its own suitable setup to run 
the operations smoothly. From an organisational perspective, this would include a Managing 
Director with other support functions like onsite human resources, finance & controlling 
management, and facilities management, and from a legal point of view these units were fully 
owned local subsidiaries of SAP AG. The lines of businesses and the managing directors 
report into global functional heads, most of whom were located in Walldorf, Germany.  
To summarize, in this phase we find that SAP consciously decided to expand its R&D 
network to keep pace with the growing needs from the success of R/3. This expansion was 
driven by some fundamental design principles around the content, process, and organisation. 
We find that as the R&D footprint was growing, SAP had to build formalisation 
(Specialisation of tasks), standardisation (Common documentation of development processes) 
and centralisation (Hub and spoke model) in its organisation structure. 
Phase 3 Building a network 2000 to 2010: In 1999, SAP launched the new ambitious 
mySAP.com strategy, which was a significant shift in its product strategy. This coupled with 
the tremendous success of R/3 created an even greater demand to expand the development 
network. More and more developers and senior managers were being added outside of 
Germany. In 2001, SAP acquired a portals company called Top Tier to boost its mySAP.com 
strategy (SAP, 2001). This was one of the largest product acquisitions that SAP had made till 
date and with it, the firm also acquired senior executives who owned complete product 
delivery but were not based in Germany. At the same time based on the learning from the 
investments in Palo Alto, Bangalore, Montreal and other lab locations, the board was more 
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confident to either expand existing operations by giving them more autonomy or replicate the 
organisational configuration in new locations based on need.   
Just like the previous set up, the post 2000 labs also have different histories and play a 
distinct role in the overall SAP development strategy. For example, SAP Labs Brazil was set 
up ‘organically’ (as opposed to an acquisition) in São Leopoldo in 2006 for two primary 
reasons; to target the growth opportunity in fast growth market like Brazil and to provide 
same time zone service and support to the US customers (SAP, 2011a). This lab is more 
aligned in its organisational practices with the US Lab and market than Germany. Whereas 
SAP Labs in Sofia, Bulgaria, that was also set up organically in 2000, focuses on only 
specific technology development (SAP, 2011b) and augments the capacity in Walldorf. Sofia 
is close to the headquarters in Walldorf, it is in the same time zone and significantly more 
cost-effective. Hence, we find that there is significantly higher alignment between Walldorf 
and Sofia.  
From an organisational design perspective, we find that in the 2000s the SAP Labs 
setup had moved from a ‘Hub & Spoke’ model to a network of labs. This is particularly 
visible with the evolution of the bigger locations in Palo Alto, Walldorf, Bangalore and 
Shanghai where SAP also had ambitious growth plans. During this period, we find two 
important developments that also make this case an ideal context to study the interaction of 
AC based on routines and innovation strategy. First, the management team introduced six 
major organisational routines (discussed in the data section) as enablers in the creation of a 
global R&D organisation. To ensure that the locations have a ‘one SAP’ culture, the 
management team ensured that the same routine was replicated across locations. Second, 
given the portfolio of locations, the headquarters set out to craft an R&D strategy to answer 
the question: what kind of development work should be done where? This gave rise to clear 
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mandate being assigned to different locations. Once again we will discuss the mandates in 
more detail when we discuss the data.      
2.4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In general, we hypothesize that R&D subsidiaries are more likely to adopt and benefit from 
AC routines that are consistent with the mandate. As noted earlier, we are looking at the 
adoption of internal and external AC routines in subsidiaries with explorative and exploitative 
R&D mandates. 
Impact of adoption of internal AC routines: In the context of a multi-unit 
organisation, internal AC routines facilitate internal communication and knowledge flow 
from different parts of the organisation. For instance, setting up of cross functional teams 
(Freeman, 1987), establishing common development methodologies (Wheelwright & Clark, 
1992), and creating common technological infrastructure and protocols for knowledge 
management systems (Davenport, David, & Beers, 1998), are routines that enable 
organisational units to share and access knowledge from other parts of the organisation more 
freely and efficiently. 
Units that operate under an exploitative mandate focus their attention on developing 
deep technical understanding of existing products, filling gaps in the product line, and 
pursuing opportunities that incrementally extend products that have an established customer 
base. Efficiency and control are central to the execution of an exploitative mandate. These 
units usually have clear delivery goals, and execute projects within strict project management 
guidelines of time, cost and quality. In general, subsidiaries with exploitative mandate are 
developed as extensions of the primary R&D hub to tap into unique locational advantages 
such as availability of a large pool of cost effective talent. This has been a prime 
consideration for many multinational companies that have built R&D subsidiaries in India. 
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The presence of large, highly skilled, but cost effective talent pool has motivated the decision 
to offshore development and refinement of products that are relatively more mature and 
hence, more technologically stable in their product lifecycle.  
An exploitative mandate leads R&D units to focus on searching for opportunities near 
existing products and technological trajectories (Benner & Tushman, 2003). These units are 
often ‘users of knowledge’ from other units (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000), and are more 
likely to benefit from the adoption of internal AC routines that enable them to access internal 
knowledge. We therefore have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1(a): The adoption of internal AC routines in units with 
exploitative R&D mandate is positively associated with innovative output. 
In contrast to units that operate under exploitative mandate, units that operate under 
an explorative mandate are encouraged to search for new technologies and markets. 
Execution of an exploratory mandate requires flexibility, autonomy, and experimentation. 
This tends to be consistent with research on new technological trajectories, building proof-of-
concepts and prototypes, and market testing of new products and services. In general, 
subsidiaries with explorative mandate are built in locations that can provide access to an 
ecosystem of key partners, customers and research institutes. For example, many 
multinational companies in technology based industries have built subsidiaries in the Silicon 
Valley to benefit from the knowledge in this unique ecosystem (Almeida, 1996; Frost, 2001).    
Having an explorative mandate focuses the unit’s attention on seeking external 
knowledge that is new to the firm, but at the same time the unit is also expected to serve as a 
‘provider of knowledge’ to the rest of the organisation (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Thus, 
even though internal AC routines are not aligned with the exploratory objective of the unit, 
their adoption is nevertheless essential for the unit to efficiently disseminate knowledge to the 
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rest of the organisation.  For this reason, the corporate HQ is often insistent that all units 
adopt common internal AC routines, even when they may have different mandates.  But 
forcing R&D units with explorative mandates to adopt internal AC routines may constrain 
their ability to capture new external knowledge. When corporate HQ embarks on a systematic 
attempt to introduce internal AC routines across all units, regardless of their primary 
mandate, this may lead to excessive standardisation of process in the case of R&D units with 
an explorative mandate. We therefore have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1(b): The adoption of internal AC routines in units with 
explorative R&D mandate is negatively associated with innovative output. 
Impact of adoption of external AC routines: Since the external environment can be 
an important source of new knowledge, technology firms often take steps to ensure that they 
have access to external sources of knowledge that are up-to-date. As mentioned earlier, this 
has led many multinational companies in the packaged-software industry to open subsidiaries 
near, or in, knowledge clusters with the intention of benefiting from knowledge spillovers 
(Almeida & Phene, 2004). The external AC routines that organisations use to capture 
knowledge from these external sources, run the gamut from basic surveys that solicit end user 
feedback to knowledge gained from long-term co-development of new products and services. 
Broadly speaking, these routines facilitate learning from partners, suppliers, customers and 
research institutes. For instance, many technology firms develop routines to reach out to ‘lead 
users’ (Von Hippel, 1986) in order to better understand future needs in fast changing markets.  
Collaborating with scientific institutions is another area where firms have sought to gain 
knowledge. Many software firms like Google and Microsoft have developed structured 
collaborative programmes with universities that allow them to scan academic research for 
new developments that may have significant commercial potential.  
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When subsidiaries have an exploitative mandate, their attention is focused on 
innovating ‘near’ existing products and technologies. The need for efficiency and control in 
such subsidiaries often leads to a well-defined scope and detailed project management plans. 
While an exploitative mandate encourages business units to develop and adopt internal AC 
routines, translating the mandate into practice is left in the hands of the local R&D managers. 
Local R&D managers may often resist strict implementation of only internal AC routines for 
exploitative R&D because this denies their unit the prestige and influence that usually 
accompany explorative research. Therefore, managers will seek to expand the scope of the 
exploitative mandate by pursuing more R&D responsibilities from the HQ (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008).  They may argue, for instance, that they must engage in what essentially 
amount to explorative research because customers’ demand of support for products or 
technologies require wider knowledge search. In other cases, managers will adopt external 
AC routines that are employed by subsidiaries that have an explorative mandate, as a way of 
legitimising a push for greater explorative responsibility from the HQ. However, by adopting 
external AC routines that are not aligned with the focus of their exploitative mandate, units 
not only waste valuable resources in a search for external knowledge with little or no 
relevance to their mandate, but they also run the risk of excessive diversification of search 
scope. This leads us to the following hypothesis:       
Hypothesis 2(a): The adoption of external AC routines in units with 
exploitative R&D mandate is negatively associated with innovative output. 
In contrast to subsidiaries that work under exploitative mandate, but seek to adopt 
external AC routines in order to engage in explorative research, subsidiaries that work under 
explorative mandate clearly benefit from the adoption of external AC routines. In the case of 
these subsidiaries, adoption of external AC routines facilitates the subsidiary’s ability to tap 
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into external knowledge sources. Specifically, such external AC routines provide various 
actors in the units the opportunity to effectively and efficiently engage with the external 
environment. This leads to our last hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 2(b): The adoption of external AC routines in units with 
explorative R&D mandate is positively associated innovative output. 
Based on these hypotheses, we propose the following ‘interaction-model’ of the effect 
of AC routines and organisational mandates on innovative output.  
Fig 2.1: The interaction of AC routines and R&D mandates  
 
2.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
2.5.1 METHODS AND DATA 
Data: Our data were collected from SAP, a large packaged-software firm with more than 
US$15 billion in annual revenues as of 2010. The firm has 14 international R&D subsidiaries 
apart from its HQ. While there is R&D activity at HQ, it is not clearly demarcated from other 
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corporate functions like marketing & communications, nor is it subject to a clear R&D 
mandate. We, therefore, decided to exclude the HQ from our analysis.  
We collected in-depth longitudinal data about the implementation of six major AC 
routines and subsidiary mandates for all 14 global R&D subsidiaries for the period 2000 to 
2010. There were three sources of data. First, we conducted detailed semi-structured 
interviews with 17 senior executives including the executive board member responsible for 
R&D for the entire organisation, the senior vice president heading the R&D centres, five 
managing directors of different R&D locations, and various vice presidents of R&D based at 
the headquarters as well as from different locations. These executives were identified by the 
senior vice president heading the R&D centres, and collectively they were responsible for 
charting out SAP’s R&D strategy. Second, we were given access to more than 200 pages of 
internal reports, numerous presentations, and we had more than 50 email correspondences 
with various managers clarifying and detailing the evolution of the R&D network and the 
implementation of various internally and externally-focused organisational practices. Third, 
we collected all publicly available information about the firm and its subsidiaries. This 
includes patent applications (from European Patent Office (EPO)), acquisition records (from 
Factiva and SDC Platinum), press coverage on external practices (from Factiva), and key 
announcements like launching of new projects or significant investments in R&D (from 
Factiva).  
2.5.2 MEASURES  
Dependent variable: Subsidiary’s innovative output. We use the count of patent applications 
made by employees of a subsidiary as the innovative output for each subsidiary in each year. 
Although our use of patent count as a direct measure of innovative output is in line with past 
studies of innovation, we are mindful that of the biases that may result: Clearly, not all R&D 
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leads to patents, and not all inventions are patented. To avoid this bias, it is important to 
understand and take into account the strategic context in which patents are created 
(Gittelman, 2008).     
In the packaged-software industry, as in any technology intensive industry, a patent is 
considered as the grant of a property right to an inventor or a group of inventors for an 
invention. Patents represent new knowledge created by the organisational unit (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993) and are regularly used as a measure of a firm’s innovative 
output (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Kotha, Zheng, & George, 2011). In this industry, managers 
file patent applications as part of their efforts to protect what they consider to be novel and 
valuable ideas (Corrocher, Malerba, & Montobbio, 2007). SAP’s approach to patenting 
conforms to this industry practice. Within SAP, the patenting process is managed by a global 
intellectual property (IP) team. As part of the process, any employee can initiate an 
application but to move forward they need the support of the global IP team and an approval 
of the group’s VP. In other words, SAP will not invest resources in pursuing the patent 
application without first evaluating the content of the patent in terms of market and 
commercial potential.  
Independent variables: Count of internal & external AC routines. First, as part of our 
preliminary interview, the senior vice president heading the R&D centres helped us identify 
an initial list of practices that may have had an impact on accessing internal and external 
knowledge. Then as part of our interviews, we asked the executives to single out the most 
important ‘standard practices’, or routines, that had a significant impact on the ability of 
R&D teams to access internal or external sources of knowledge. To control for retrospective 
biases, we asked the executives to focus on specific parts of the study period and 
corroborated the responses across interviewees as well as with documentary evidence where 
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available, to precisely track the introduction of the practice and any changes thereafter. From 
an initial list of five internal and three external practices, we had to drop two internal 
practices. In one case the practice was adopted in only one location before it was abandoned, 
and in the other it was adopted for less than a year and then abandoned. We were left with 
three internal and three external practices that were singled out as having had significant 
impact by the management team. Table 2.1 provides a description of the routines and how 
they relate to similar routines discussed in the AC literature. In the organisational context, 
these routines are interchangeably called standard operating procedures, best practices or 
simply standard practice.    
We identified the year in which a particular routine was rolled-out in each subsidiary. 
In a few cases a routine was withdrawn (e.g. withdrawal of the co-location policy) from some 
locations, while in a few cases there was a time lag between the initial roll-out and the full 
adoption of a routine. These cases were identified by managers with specific knowledge of 
such cases and were excluded from the active routine count. Subsequently, we created a 
record to count the number of active internal and external routines for each subsidiary-year.10   
   
  
                                                             
10
 Our study site is SAP that is a German firm with a global R&D organization. Scholars have 
argued that firm culture is a key determinant of the inventive activities. While we have not 
taken into consideration the culture at SAP or more precisely if there is a variation in the 
culture across the subsidiaries, we believe that it may not have a huge impact on our 
empirical analysis. First as this is a single case study we can assume that there is a ‘SAP 
Culture’ that is common across all subsidiaries. Next we expect that there would be a location 
specific culture, for instance the subsidiary in Israel is likely to have a different culture 
compared to the subsidiary in China. However, we assume that the culture variable in each 
subsidiary is time invariant and so a fixed effects model would adequately take into 
consideration any subsidiary specific culture effects on inventive activities.   
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Table 2.1: List of Absorptive Capacity Routines 
Routine  Nature of 
the 
routine 
Description Similar routines in AC 
literature  
Standard 
development 
methodology 
[Standard X] 
Internal 
AC 
A common standard of how the firm aims to invent, produce, and 
manage products throughout the entire lifecycle i.e. from design to 
maintenance across multiple versions, teams and locations. It contains 
specific guidelines on all aspects of development most notably 
documentation and knowledge management, software security, testing, 
and production standards.  
 
The Standard X methodology was rolled-out across all locations in the 
period 2004 – 2006. During this time, all developers underwent 
training relevant to their role on how to adopt these standards. This 
common development standard is considered to be a significant 
enabler in the globalisation of R&D. As one of the development heads 
pointed out -    
Standardisation of processes to 
ensure efficiency. For example, 
Szulanski (2000) notes how the 
‘copy exact’ principle is used 
by organisations to leverage 
optimisation of processes 
across different units. A 
standardised development 
methodology is known to 
create the basis for 
interoperability and 
interchangeability of pieces of 
large projects (Kanigel, 2005; 
Wheelwright & Clark, 1992) 
In their review of AC routines 
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“I have teams in Germany, China and India … these standards ensure 
that we are all on the same plane of reference. It ensures that all our 
products are developed to the same highest standards wherever its 
developed” 
 
Lewin et al. (2011) also note 
that routines that share superior 
practices and knowledge, are 
key internal AC routines. 
Co-location 
programmes 
Internal 
AC 
A programme in which a group of expatriates are sent to a location to 
achieve a specific objective like setting up a new R&D centre, new 
team, or participate in long term intense development activities. The 
co-location programme is separate from short term travel (which is 
common). As part of this practice the group of developers are given 
long term (usually more than 12 months) expatriate contracts. If more 
than 1% of the employees of a location are on expatriate contracts, then 
the host location is said to have an active co-location programme.    
 
Such programmes are estimated to be quite expensive for the firm and 
require approval from a board level executive. This routine was 
introduced and practiced in some locations between the years 2002 – 
The use of practices involving 
expatriate to facilitate internal 
knowledge flows is well 
documented. (Chang, Gong, & 
Peng, 2012; Mäkelä, 2007) 
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2007, but discontinued mostly due to cost reasons. A development 
head notes the importance of this initiative in the early stages of 
development of a project -  
 
“Three [locations] is not a very good number from a coordination 
perspective… they are crying for co-location sessions! They believe 
that co-location would benefit and focus now [early stages]”  
Mandatory 
setting up of 
cross-functional 
teams  
Internal 
AC 
The R&D organisation had built teams of specialists who were not 
necessarily part of the core development team. For example, specialists 
in user interface (UI) design or quality management were included in 
an actual development project only at the behest of the development 
head.  
 
In 2008, the R&D organisation introduced mandatory policy of setting 
up cross-functional teams as part of a major reorganisation. This 
practice was subsequently implemented across locations in a phased 
manner. Such routines enable development teams to identify new 
opportunities as they plan and develop, as opposed to discovering 
opportunities on completion of development – when it might be too 
In the technology management 
literature, the internal routines 
for setting up of cross-
functional teams, has been 
known to promote the 
generation of new ideas 
(Freeman, 1987; Sethi, Smith, 
& Park, 2001; Wheelwright & 
Clark, 1992)  
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late or too expensive to implement. A development head pointed this 
out as -    
 
“Experts can contribute early on in the development cycle … quality 
managers can work with the developers to fix bugs as they appear … 
[so that] the developer would not do the same error again”  
Links to the local 
developers’ 
community  
External 
AC 
The firm introduced two standard routines to establish connections 
with the local developers’ community. As part of both the 
programmes, the local subsidiary organizes 2-3 day events where 
members of the community are invited to participate in various 
activities like showcasing new ideas, demonstration of prototypes and 
products, and co-development projects. These events target freelance 
developers and individuals from partners firms and universities.  
 
This routine not only provides a gateway to establish connections with 
the local developers’ community, it also serves as a multiplier. For 
example, the head of a local community development programme 
notes –  
Routines that enable the 
development of local networks 
with partner organisations, 
universities and research 
institutions are known to 
improve the firm’s ability to 
learn from external knowledge 
(Koch & Strotmann, 2008).  
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“When a partner sees a demo of an exciting new product that was 
developed with another partner, they want to do the same with us… 
[This event] makes our ecosystem grow.” 
Alliance with 
local partners 
External 
AC 
The firm introduced a formal standardised programme of collaboration 
with local partners in co-development mode within the research centre. 
As part of this routine, developers co-locate to the R&D centre of the 
firm to pursue a common objective. The infrastructure is jointly 
sponsored by the firm and the partners. Before commencing on such 
collaborations, an alliance agreement is signed between the involved 
parties. Partners bring in their expertise and new knowledge into these 
collaborations. The development head of this initiative notes –  
 
“We and our partners bring the latest generation hardware and 
software [as part of this programme] … we hope that this 
collaboration will lead to prototypes that can meet the most pressing 
challenges and opportunities”  
Routines that build different 
types of long term relationships 
with partners can be a source 
of new knowledge for the firm. 
These routines can be co-
development relationships 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998) , R&D 
partnerships (Tether, 2002), or 
strategic alliances (Joshi & 
Nerkar, 2011)  
Collaborating External The firm introduced a standardised programme in which teams of Customer engagement and lead 
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with local 
customers  
AC developers from an R&D subsidiary work with early adopters of 
technology in the local market. As part of this initiative, developers get 
feedback directly from the end user of the prototype. This often leads 
to fine-tuning of the product’s features, release dates etc. These 
collaborative engagements are usually setup with important long term 
customers and are bound by confidentiality agreements.  
 
Customers and end user feedback during the early stages of the product 
lifecycle can provide valuable insights. For example, a development 
head notes that – 
 
“One of our largest customer wanted [a new application] seamlessly 
integrated with … We set up a project with the customers to prototype 
this new app … now it is a standard feature” 
user engagement programmes 
are known to be a source of 
new opportunities for 
innovation. (Foss et al., 2011; 
Von Hippel, 1986, 2009)  
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Exploitative and Explorative Organisational Mandates: Bettis and Prahalad (1995) 
note that the views of top managers, preferably obtained by first-hand interviews, are suitable 
source of data for determining the dominant organisation logic. The coding for mandate was 
done on the basis of semi-structured interviews with 17 senior executives in R&D. The 
interviews lasted between one and two hours, and were recorded and transcribed. At least two 
researchers were present at all interviews. We followed an interview protocol for the semi-
structured interviews (Yin, 2003) (See appendix 1). Table 2.2 lists the basis for the coding of 
the mandate. In general, subsidiaries with an explorative mandate are engaged in ‘blue sky’ 
projects without anticipated payoff horizon, or product or technology research projects that 
are in an early stage. In contrast, subsidiaries with an exploitative mandate have relatively 
more mature and stable projects, relating to existing products and technology. Based on our 
interviews with top managers at SAP, we coded the mandate for each subsidiary-year as two 
dichotomous variables i.e. presence of exploitative R&D mandate, and presence of 
explorative R&D mandate. 
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Table 2.2: Overview of the subsidiary mandates 
Mandate Project attributes Location attributes Typical performance 
indicators  
Typical quotes from 
executives 
Exploitative  Presence of R&D topics that were 
initially developed in other 
subsidiaries and were subsequently 
relocated. Key terms used in this 
context are hand-over, localisation, 
integrations, and building on 
core/stable products, and 
maintenance.  
These topics were described to 
have strict delivery road maps, 
characterised by long periods of 
knowledge transfer, quality 
management, testing or 
maintenance. 
   
The subsidiary was set 
up organically (as 
opposed to an 
acquisition) and the 
reasons of founding 
were observed as 
availability of low cost 
talent in large numbers, 
overlap of normal 
working hours with the 
HQ, or common 
communication 
language. 
 
The subsidiary’s 
performance is likely 
to be measured by the 
following metrics: 
fully loaded cost per 
developer, attrition/ 
turnover, project 
delivery timelines, and 
quality of products.  
“The entire [Product P] is 
now developed from this 
location” 
 
Product P is a mature and 
stable product. Its largest 
market is the US. It was 
conceived and initially 
developed in other 
subsidiaries and the 
responsibility for future 
incremental releases and 
maintenance was later 
transferred to this subsidiary. 
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Explorative  Presence of topics that are at the 
early stages of research, including 
prototyping and market testing. 
Key terms used in this context are 
next generation, design, prototypes, 
demos, and future technology.  
 
These topics also have delivery 
timelines but the focus is more on 
building the ‘latest’ and ‘greatest’ 
products for the future rather than 
sticking to a deadline.     
The subsidiary was 
acquired and the 
reasons for founding 
were observed as 
presence of partners, 
key customers or 
specific technical 
experts (start-ups) or 
academic research 
centres.  
The subsidiary was 
established in spite of it 
relatively high cost. 
Typically 3-4 times 
more than exploitative 
subsidiaries.  
 
 
The subsidiary’s 
performance is likely 
to be measured by the 
following metrics: 
Innovations in the 
development of new 
products, 
technologies, design 
that generates new 
revenue opportunities, 
and product launches.    
“We want to build the latest 
and greatest cutting edge 
technology” 
 
The team was working on a 
new UI technology that 
would be used by other teams 
in the future. 
 
“We are in investment mode 
now. It’s not revenue 
generating – yet!” 
 
Indicates that this project is in 
an early stage of research. 
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While the mandate of a subsidiary remained mostly constant in our study period, in a 
few cases we observed a change in the mandate. This happened for two reasons. First, due to 
acquisitions that had substantial impact on the company. For example, a Canadian acquisition 
that was eight times the size (by headcount) of the existing local subsidiary led to the 
introduction of new exploratory projects. Second, management concluding that changes in 
the external local environment of the subsidiary required mandate change. Modification in a 
subsidiary’s mandate due to external environment was coded when the firm set up a special 
programme to initiate the change. For example, the firm introduced an exploration mandate 
in the R&D centre in China by announcing a multimillion dollar investment package to 
develop products in China for the Chinese market, by outlining its intention of working 
closely with local partners.  
Control variables: We collected data on the following four control variables: size, 
collaboration with HQ, number of acquisitions, and age of the subsidiary.  
Size: Previous research suggests that organisational size strongly influences 
innovation (Damanpour, 1992). We, therefore, used the size of the subsidiary as a control 
variable. The size of the subsidiary was measured by the average number of employees 
involved in R&D work in each subsidiary-year. Development headcount is a better estimate 
than R&D cost (which is often used in similar studies), as we found that the average cost per 
developer in a high cost location (e.g. US or Germany) can be up to four times the average 
cost per developer in a low cost location (e.g. Hungary or India).     
Collaboration with the HQ: Scholars such as Hansen (1999) and Tsai (2001) have 
proposed that a unit’s position and ties with the key source of internal knowledge may also 
influence its access to knowledge and therefore its innovative output. In a multinational R&D 
Network, the HQ is the primary source of internal knowledge and a tradition of collaboration 
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with the HQ is likely to give the subsidiary more access to the HQ’s knowledge pool. The 
collaboration with the HQ was measured as the percentage of joint patent applications 
between the subsidiary and the HQ. A higher percentage of joint patent applications indicate 
a stronger link with the HQ. 
Number of acquisitions: Acquisitions can be a major source of new knowledge in a 
subsidiary. We count the number instances for each subsidiary-year where an acquisition 
valued over US$100 million was integrated.  
Age of the subsidiary: Scholars such as Autio, Sapienza, and Almeida (2000) have 
suggested that age is a key determinant of an unit’s ability to acquire knowledge. Therefore, 
we introduce age; measured as the number of years a subsidiary has been operational, as a 
control variable.  
 
2.5.3 ANALYSIS 
Since our dependent variable is a count of patent applications, we use a panel negative 
binomial regression model with fixed effects (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). A negative 
binomial model is suitable for count data as it ensures that the zero values of the dependent 
variables are not truncated. Furthermore, the negative binomial regression model is better 
than a Poisson regression model in this context as the variance of the dependent variable is 
more than the mean. Such a technique is common for patent count studies (Lahiri, 2010). A 
panel data model within the same organisation enables us to effectively study variables that 
change over time but remain the same across subsidiaries. In our model, we assume that 
something (unobserved) within the subsidiary may impact or bias the dependent variables and 
we need to control for this. A fixed effect model removes the effect of those time-invariant 
characteristics so we can assess the independent variable’s net effect.  
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Results: The descriptive statistics and correlation table (Table 2.3) show that as expected 
both internal and external AC routines are positively correlated with the innovative output of 
the subsidiaries. The control variables - age of the subsidiary, number of acquisitions, and the 
size of the subsidiary, are all positively correlated with the dependent variable. This supports 
our choice of controls. The correlation table also points to the relative adoption of internal 
and external AC routines by subsidiaries with exploitative and explorative mandate. For 
instance, we find that subsidiaries with a mandate for exploitative innovation are more likely 
to adopt internal AC practices and subsidiaries that have explorative R&D mandates are more 
likely to adopt external AC routines. This suggests that subsidiaries try to align AC routines 
to the mandate. Another interesting observation that can be seen from the descriptive 
statistics is that the collaboration with the HQ is positive in subsidiaries with an exploitative 
R&D mandate, whereas it is negative in subsidiaries with an explorative mandate.  
In model 2 of the regression table (Table 2.4) we find that the introduction of internal 
and external AC routines improves the units’ innovative output. This provides empirical 
evidence to shows that the incidence of technological innovation is positively affected by the 
build-up of AC, through the introduction of AC routines. Next, we take a closer look at how 
this overall impact can be understood as an interaction of the AC routines and organisational 
mandates. In model 4 we find support for all our hypotheses of the interaction model. We 
find that the impact of the internal AC routine is boosted by the presence of an exploitative 
R&D mandate, while the introduction of internal AC routines in a unit with an explorative 
mandate, negatively impacts its inventive outcome. Similarly, the introduction of external AC 
routines in a unit with an explorative R&D mandate boosts its inventive outcome and has a 
negative impact when the unit has an exploitative R&D mandate. However in the full model 
i.e. model 5 we get support for only two of our four hypotheses for internal and external AC 
routines in the subsidiaries with an exploitation mandate.  
68 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3:  Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
Subsidiary’s 
Innovative 
output 
15.18 23.78 0 151 
        
2 Internal AC 
routines 0.96 0.74 0 3 0.210+        
3 External AC 
routines 1.41 1.04 0 3 0.336*** 0.229***       
4 Exploitation 
mandate 0.33 0.47 0 1 -0.099 0.253*** -0.522***      
5 Exploration 
mandate 0.73 0.45 0 1 0.0815 -0.081 0.744** -0.838***     
6 Age of the 
subsidiary 6.56 4.51 1 34 0.402*** 0.522*** 0.559*** -0.135 0.297***    
7 Collaboration 
with HQ  29.94 32.16 0 100 0.046 0.033 -0.082 0.331*** -0.288*** -0.134   
8 Number of 
acquisitions 0.16 0.48 0 4 0.384*** 0.201* 0.262** -0.050 0.086 0.267*** -0.027  
9 
Size of 
subsidiary (log 
of headcount) 
5.29 1.35 0 7.6 0.482*** 0.423*** 0.144 0.324*** -0.182* 0.492*** 0.108 0.316*** 
Sample size 14 subsidiaries, 128 subsidiary-year observations 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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Table 2.4: Results of a panel negative binomial fixed effects regression for subsidiary’s innovative output 
Dependant variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Subsidiary’s innovative output Intercept Only AC routines Only Mandates Interaction model Full model 
Internal AC routines 
 
0.234* (-0.124) 
    
-0.432 (0.391) 
External AC routines 
 
0.323*** (-0.100) 
    
1.473*** (0.391) 
Exploitation Mandate 
  
-0.279 (0.329) 
  
0.056 (0.763) 
Exploration Mandate 
  
0.215 (0.263) 
  
0.053 (0.932) 
Internal AC routines * 
Exploitation mandate H 1(a) 
  0.629*** (0.162) 1.034*** (0.309) 
Internal AC routines * 
Exploration mandate  H 1(b) 
  
-0.305** (0.150) 0.042 (0.343) 
External AC routines * 
Exploitation mandate  H 2(a) 
  
-0.587** (0.277) -1.202*** (0.326) 
External AC routines * 
Exploration mandate  H 2(b) 
   0.791*** (0.278) -0.194 (0.312) 
Age of the subsidiary 0.103 (0.074) -0.005 (0.083) 0.076 (0.0790) 0.096 (0.117) 0.018 (0.108) 
Collaboration with HQ 0.005** (0.002) 0.004+ (0.002) 0.005* (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
Number of acquisitions 
-0.008 (0.076) -0.017 (0.073) -0.018 (0.078) 0.033 (0.062) 0.032 (0.054) 
Size of subsidiary (log of 
headcount) 
0.469*** (0.123) 0.500*** (0.123) 0.473*** (0.122) 0.363*** (0.126) 0.375** (0.124) 
Constant 
-3.396*** (0.889) -3.531*** (0.901) -3.457*** (0.934) -2.763*** (0.808) -2.627* (1.249) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subsidiary FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood 
-305.999  -299.651  -305.116  -293.707  -281.967  
Wald Chi2 120.38*** 136.91*** 119.07*** 231.56*** 307.10*** 
Degrees of freedom 14 16 16 18 22 
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 
Number of subsidiaries 14 14 14 14 14 
Standard errors in parentheses; year dummies calculated not shown 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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2.6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Directionally, there are two types of AC routines i.e. internal AC routines that enable the flow 
of internal knowledge to different units and external AC routines that enable the flow of 
external knowledge into the organisation (Lewin et al., 2011). Scholars suggests that 
organisations would benefit most from a ‘balanced’ adoption of internal and external AC 
routines (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lewin et al., 2011). This study develops a deeper 
understanding of how the balance between internal and external AC routines is skewed, based 
on an interaction with the R&D mandate.  
We argue that management teams often rely on a ‘dominant logic’ (Bettis & Prahalad, 
1995) to organise R&D. This ‘dominant logic’ aligns the attention of managers to the firm’s 
innovation objectives. This allows the management team to assign R&D mandates to units 
without getting into the full complexity of execution. Therefore, the mandate focuses the 
unit’s attention on internal or external knowledge, while the AC routines provide the 
mechanism to access it. Even though some scholars have indicated that organisational 
antecedents matter in the realising the potential from AC (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2005; Volberda et al., 2010), hardly any scholarly work has explored the effect of 
alignment or misalignment of AC routines at the micro level with the organisation’s R&D 
mandate at the macro level. Our research aims to address this gap by proposing that the R&D 
mandate of an organisational unit is a key determinant of the effectiveness of AC routines in 
promoting or inhibiting innovative output. 
 Implications for research on absorptive capacity routines: We see our study as 
having three key implications for the research on AC routines. First, we provide evidence to 
show that the introduction of internal and external AC routines positively impact innovative 
output in R&D subsidiaries. Second, and perhaps more significantly, we show that AC 
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routines do not work in isolation, but that the R&D mandate of an organisational unit 
determines impact of AC routines. And finally, we show that instances of misalignment 
between AC routines and R&D mandates can lead to dysfunctional innovation outcomes. 
Together, these implications add to our understanding of how firms balance the adoption of 
internal and external AC routines at the level of the organisational unit, based on its 
innovation mandate.  
Fig 2.2: Balance of internal and external AC routines in the context of mandates 
 
Using Lewin et al. (2011) typology of internal and external AC routines, our study is the first 
of its kind to provide evidence that the introduction of AC routines positively impacts 
innovative output. While many studies have highlighted the role of internal and external 
sources of knowledge, our longitudinal study design allowed us to study the mechanism i.e. 
the same set of AC routines that enable access to internal and external sources of knowledge.   
Next, we show that the R&D mandate of an organisational unit is a key variable in 
our understanding of which AC routine is adopted, and how AC routines impact innovation? 
Evidence from prior research shows that AC routines are more likely to be adopted when 
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managers perceive them to be useful in meeting their R&D objectives. For instance, Allen, 
Lee, and Tushman (1980) found that when organisations pursue incremental innovations in 
existing products and processes, they adopt and benefit from good internal knowledge 
sharing practices. While Cardinal (2001), in a study of pharmaceutical firms, found that 
projects that had an objective to pursue innovations on novel technological trajectories were 
more likely to tap external knowledge sources. This observation is also reflected in our 
interview data. For example, a senior vice president in R&D pointed out the essential role of 
internal AC routines in subsidiaries with the mandate to maintain existing products:   
“We have some labs with a pure maintenance focus … [standard X] makes 
sure that we keep a common development standard across this network [of 
R&D labs doing maintenance]” 
On the other hand, some subsidiaries were built to connect with external clusters. In this case, 
external AC routines clearly enable this purpose. A development head recounted the 
underlying reasons for setting up a research centre in the Silicon Valley as:  
“[A founder of the firm] moved to Palo Alto to setup a lab there … our 
largest partners were American, North America was our biggest market … 
we wanted to be part of the innovation from the Silicon Valley”  
Finally, we show that the misalignment of internal AC routines and explorative R&D 
mandates can depress innovation outcomes. We propose that when internal AC routines are 
introduced in subsidiaries with an explorative mandate, managers do not always find them 
useful in meeting their primary objective to seek external knowledge. However, these internal 
AC routines are often imposed by corporate teams to ensure more effective diffusion of new 
knowledge throughout the organisation. As one senior executive at a unit with an explorative 
mandate points out:  
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“I encourage my developers to experiment. There are no rules here. We 
want to build the latest and greatest cutting edge technology… You will 
see this in the culture in everything we do. The way we work, our 
workspace, the tools … everything.” He later adds “Our strategy is to 
innovate on a stable core, which means that whatever innovations we 
bring must complement and not disrupt the core. It is very important 
that the customer’s landscape is not disrupted and that the end-user has 
a seamless experience... We have to follow the same development 
standards as everyone else.” 
These standardised processes are often perceived as ‘bureaucratic’ and may lead to 
excessive standardisation of processes in these subsidiaries. In a comparative case analysis 
Dougherty (1992) shows that internal AC routines can indeed impose strict standards that do 
not meet the requirements of new product development and form barriers to innovation. She 
goes on to point out that successful innovators often do not comply with non-value adding 
routines.  
Misalignment can also happen when units with an exploitative R&D mandate adopt 
external AC routines. When the mandate of the organisational unit is to exploit existing 
knowledge, the introduction of external AC routines exposes the unit to new and often 
unrelated knowledge from outside the firm. This expands the knowledge pool available to the 
unit, albeit not productively, and leads to an excessive diversification of the scope of the unit. 
The adoption of external AC routines, especially by units with an exploitative mandate, is 
expensive. While it is uncommon for decision makers to invest in such routines in 
exploitative units, in our data we found that 13 out of 41 exploitative subsidiary-years had at 
least one active external AC routine. We believe that this misalignment is caused when 
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decision makers within the exploitative units (as opposed to the HQ’s prerogative) adopt 
external AC routines. One explanation of why this could occur is offered by institutional 
theory, which argues that mimetic and normative mechanisms may lead to adoption of 
routines independent of the mandate of the subsidiary (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987). A mimetic mechanism operates when the subsidiary imitates 
routines from more successful subsidiaries (often labelled ‘best-practice sharing’), whereas a 
normative mechanism operates when the subsidiary adopts routines that are viewed as 
appropriate for the type of environment by the local decision maker. In these cases, it is 
unlikely that the introduction of external AC routines will result in the unit gaining similar 
type of external knowledge as in the case of explorative units. Instead, the investment in these 
routines may develop the ecosystem for future exploration. In such instances, when the 
subsidiary invests in external AC routines, knowledge tends to flow outwards and local 
partners are the chief beneficiaries. As a Managing Director of an R&D centre with an 
exploitative mandate notes:  
“We are here not just because of the cost and talent. We see great 
opportunities in this location for both the market and the partner 
ecosystem … We want to develop our local ecosystem … [by] training 
partners … [by] training university students”  
Limitations and future research: While this study provides a number of insights, it also has 
some limitations. First as our focus was to study the same AC routine, we purposefully 
selected a ‘deeper’ design and restricted our analysis to one large firm. Future studies may 
develop a ‘wider’ methodology by designing measures to compare similar routines across a 
larger sample of firms in the same industry. Second, we have assumed that all internal and 
external AC routines have the same magnitude. While this has greatly simplified our analysis, 
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a more nuanced analysis could explore the interaction of organisational mandates and specific 
routines. Finally, as many scholars have noted – the count of patents does not capture all 
innovative output and not all patents have the same potential of commercialisation. An 
examination of the impact and quality of inventions would further improve our understanding 
of this effect.   
We believe that this study opens up a new area of research on the interaction of 
innovation strategy as R&D mandates and the mechanisms that build AC i.e. AC routines. 
Our results show that a misalignment of R&D mandate and directionality of the AC routines 
can reduce innovative activity. Further research is needed to understand the underlying 
causes of this misalignment. In particular, we need to know more about the micro level 
process by which agents in these locations search for new routines as well as the macro level 
processes that guide the diffusion of routines across firm boundaries.  
In our analysis we have argued that absorptive capacity as a capability is built by the 
practice of absorptive capacity routines. This is in line with the literature on capabilities in 
general that argues organizational capabilities are built on routines or collection of routines 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003). This stream of literature from the capabilities 
tradition does not adequately deal with innovation that may come about from wide 
experimentation or serendipitous discoveries. However, the later can be understood through 
the lens of organizational slack. As our literature review indicates the relationship between 
slack and incidence of innovation is often treated as an inverted U i.e. too little or too much 
organizational slack is not conducive to innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  Put differently, 
if ‘free time’ is considered to be a proxy for organizational slack then having no free time and 
having a lot of free time may not turn out to be conducive for innovation. However as many 
organizations such as 3M and Google point out giving employees some amount of free time 
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may improve inventive productivity.  In essence AC, or AC built of AC routines is not 
necessarily the only predictor of inventive activities in an organization but there are clearly 
other variables that influence the incidence of innovation. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Current research on technological innovation in global firms with foreign R&D subsidiaries, 
is largely dominated by the knowledge-based view (Almeida & Phene, 2004; Lahiri, 2010; 
Monteiro, Arvidsson, & Birkinshaw, 2008; Phene & Almeida, 2008; Song, Asakawa, & Chu, 
2011; Tallman & Phene, 2007). This stream of literature suggests that R&D productivity is 
influenced by the subsidiary’s embeddedness in the internal knowledge context of the parent 
firm (i.e. HQ), and the external knowledge context of its location. While these studies have 
greatly added to our understanding of how knowledge flows impact innovation in subsidiaries 
at a macro level, they do not shed much light on the impact of intra-organisational attributes 
on innovation, largely because they assume that all subsidiaries in a firm have the same role 
to pursue innovation. However, as Almeida and Phene (2004: 860), have pointed out, 
subsidiary mandates vary, and to understand the R&D strategy of large global corporations, it 
is necessary to take account of “how different subsidiary strategies and roles impact 
innovation and evolution.” 
Our analysis suggests that R&D mandates are a central pillar in understating how 
various routines to access knowledge impact innovation. R&D mandates are usually 
consistent and tailored to minimize the subsidiary constraints and make the best of its 
capabilities. In some cases this means crafting an R&D mandate that builds on a subsidiary 
strengths for exploring new areas. In other instances, this means giving subsidiaries with a 
track record in established and well exploited technological areas, an R&D mandate that 
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makes the most of their cost effectiveness. Organisational units are more likely to be effective 
if top managers evaluate and align the strategies and roles of each subsidiary that reflect the 
location’s history i.e. knowledge and skills with the adoption of suitable AC routines.     
This essay provides new insight into how corporate innovation strategy at the macro 
level influences choices of adopting routines at the micro level. It also opens up new 
questions on a relatively micro-micro relation, which is, while we expect decision makers to 
choose a routine from an existing set of choices, when would they initiate search for a new 
routines? Put differently, what kind of structural constraints might trigger search for new 
routines?   
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3. INGENUITY AND THE CREATION OF NEW ROUTINES: EVIDENCE FROM 
LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ohno-San came by the Kyoto Plant about once a week for the next six 
months. He reminded us frequently and severely what we needed to do: 
“Make do with the equipment you’ve got.” 
“Don’t automate anything.” 
“Don't spend any money.” 
“Limit your production output to the numbers in the sales plan.” 
“Your costs will eat up all your profit if you don’t watch out, so don’t hire 
more people” 
As soon as we complied with Ohno-San’s insistence on monitoring the pace 
of work cycles, he raised the stakes.    
Michikazu Tanaka (Production manager at Toyota affiliate Daihatsu) 
Excerpts from (Tanaka, 2009: 33) 
 
Consider the following case of ingenuity at Daihatsu. Under pressure from Taiichi 
Ohno, production chief at Toyota, to ramp up production, and cut costs, but explicitly 
instructed not to use new technology, Michikazu Tanaka and his team at Daihatsu came up 
with the idea of placing speakers along the line and playing different musical tones at the end 
of each part of the production, to pace the line. This solution was soon incorporated as a 
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standard practice in all of Toyota’s lean production systems and later adopted throughout the 
world of lean based automobile manufacturing units. In this essay we will take a closer look 
at what triggers agents to perceive new opportunities and search for qualitatively better 
routines. For instance, what triggered Michikazu Tanaka and his team at Daihatsu to search 
for new opportunities? 
A rich tradition of research in innovation shows that some firms are able to innovate 
more than others, for example, larger firms (Damanpour, 1992), new entrants (Foster, 1986), 
or firms with access to greater resources and capabilities (Methe et al., 1997) and knowledge 
(Zhang & Li, 2010). But do these firms necessarly come up with better innovations? Many 
scholars of behavioural theory argue that innovation is not just a function of the so called 
measurable economic variables, such as investments in R&D, but it is also a result of 
relatively less measurable variables like managerial cognition of opportunities that influences 
managerial decision making. They propose that managers are not entirely rational when 
searching for opportunities to innovate, but in fact rely on their interpretation of available 
information to make strategic decisions. For instance, when it comes to investment decisions 
for new R&D projects, it is common knowledge that executives who project confidence in a 
new plan are more likely to get approval than the ones who project the risks and constraints 
of the plan. The behavioural perspective of how decision makers perceive opportunities is a 
central pillar in our understanding of why some firms innovate more and perhaps better than 
others.    
We know that over time decision making in organisations become routinized and 
form predictable patterns. The use of routines in decision-making processes help agents to 
economise on cognitive effort of searching and focus on productivity gains from labour 
effort. For instance, if a decision maker finds that current sales in a region are lower than its 
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rival, she might follow the organisational routine, often based on past experiences, of 
allocating more resources (labour effort) to promote short-term sales in that region over a 
long-term investment. Such a reallocation of resources may indeed come as a result of a 
routine that helps to answer “how to choose” questions.   
In reality however, these choices are not static, but evolve by the variation, selection, 
and retention of underlying routines by decision makers as they respond to new problems 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Organisations often confront new problems when there is a 
‘mismatch’ between available resources and desired outcome. These circumstances arise 
when organisations face reduced resource availability, for instance due to external supply 
shock, or a shift in desired outcome that may be among other things due to new regulations or 
changing competitive conditions, or financial constraints. Under these circumstances, 
decision makers are often forced to choose between lowering their aspiration, searching for 
new opportunities, or rethinking their existing routines.   
In this essay we look at the third option. Specifically, we argue that when 
organisations are neither able to obtain more resources, nor willing to compromise on their 
aspiration, they will turn their attention to internal production and management processes.    
This focussing of attention on internal processes may result in attempts to pressure employees 
to economise on the use of existing resources or accelerate production processes. In some 
situations, employees may push hard to meet these targets without questioning existing 
methods and practices (i.e. apply more labour effort/ work harder), but in others their 
observation and analysis of production processes may lead them to ‘see’ better ways of 
arriving at the desired targets (i.e. apply cognitive effort to search/ work smarter). Such 
insights are often at the origins of new practices and our aim to understand what triggers 
some decision makers to search for better routines.  
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Aspiration and constraints may focus the attention of agents (at the micro level) to 
search for new and better routines to improve productivity. We argue that under normal 
conditions, an agent’s familiarity with the routines of a task helps them to economise on the 
cognitive effort of search and focus attention on performance improvement through labour 
effort, when such labour effort is available i.e. apply more resources using known techniques. 
However, under sufficiently high aspiration and resource constraints, the routines can be 
rendered ineffective, thereby framing agents to search for better routines through cognitive 
effort. We design two experiments to test the relationship between high aspiration from 
competitive pressure and performance through the increase in labour effort (apply known 
solutions) and cognitive effort (search for new solutions) in repeated task and a novel task. 
Our results show that agents are more likely to discover new routines under high aspiration 
and resource constraints. 
 
3.2 MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF SEARCH FOR NEW ROUTINES 
At the heart of the organisational ingenuity discussion (Lampel et al., 2014) lies the argument 
– How do agents frame problems under constraints?11 For instance, when placed under 
constraints do they problematize the lack of resources, idiosyncratic environmental 
conditions, or would they problematize internal processes i.e. the way a particular objective 
can be achieved. The latter option, of framing the problem as not having the right internal 
processes or routines, then triggers cognitive effort in searching for a better routine.    
                                                             
11
 For details see the special issue on Organisational Ingenuity in Organisation Studies and 
the edited volume Handbook Of Organisational And Entrepreneurial Ingenuity. 
 Lampel, J., Honig, B., & Drori, I. 2014. Organisational Ingenuity: Concept, Processes and 
Strategies. Organisation Studies, 35(4): 465-482. 
Honig, B., Lampel, J., & Drori, I. (Eds.). 2014. Handbook Of Organisational And 
Entrepreneurial Ingenuity: Edward Elgar. 
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In this essay we are interested in understanding if agents rely on labour effort i.e. 
apply known solutions with more resources or cognitive effort i.e. search for ingenious 
solutions to improve performance under high aspiration set by competitive pressure while 
performing (a) a repeated task and (b) a novel task. We argue that while there is a large body 
of evidence to show that cognitive effort suffers under pressure; there is still a possibility that 
high competitive pressure may trigger cognitive effort in questioning implicit and explicit 
routine assumptions that might otherwise limit performance. 
A repeated task, much like any real-world production task, is characterized by 
routines that form production techniques (Nelson & Winter, 1982). As agents involved in the 
execution of a repeated task gain experience, they become more proficient with the 
underlying routines, leading to increasing productivity at a decreasing rate, as observed in 
various industries from semiconductor production (Gruber, 1994) to pizza production (Darr, 
Argote, & Epple, 1995). The use of routines acts like decision-rules that help agents to 
economise on the cognitive effort and focus their attention on labour effort. Put differently, 
once the routines involved in executing a repeated task are established, agents know ‘how to 
do’ the task and apply labour effort to meet the production targets. In such a scenario, 
increasing competitive pressure may first induce agents to apply more labour effort to 
improve performance, indicating a preference for labour effort, but sufficiently high 
competitive pressure may also trigger agents to question the underlying routines and increase 
cognitive effort to search for better routines. This indicates the existence of a possibility that 
under competitive pressure, agents may apply more cognitive effort to search for better 
routines to improve productivity at repeated tasks. 
On the other hand when agents are presented with novel tasks (e.g. problem solving) 
they do not have the answers to ‘how to do’ questions. In such cases agents depend heavily 
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on their working memory, which is an indication of cognitive effort, to find solutions. 
However, evidence from both psychology and behavioural economics dealing with work 
effort and performance under pressure, suggests that performance at cognitive tasks is 
negatively associated with pressure, often leading to either poor performance i.e. ‘choking 
under pressure’ or an avoidance of tasks that involve ‘thinking’ (Beilock & Carr, 2001; 
Beilock, Kulp, Holt, & Carr, 2004; Bracha & Fershtman, 2013). Beilock and Carr (2005) 
offer a psychological explanation that argues increasing performance pressure consumes an 
agents working memory capacity that is required for superior performance in cognitive tasks 
such as solving mathematical problems. We propose that in certain novel tasks, superior 
performance may also be achieved by reframing of the problem. While under low 
competitive pressure the cognitive effort applied in search for solutions is bound by the 
implicit assumptions about how the problem is framed by the agent, a sufficiently high 
competitive pressure may trigger agents to question theses underlying assumptions. We aim 
to test if high aspiration, set by high competitive pressure, is likely to trigger a ‘framing 
effect’ that directs cognitive effort to question the explicit and implicit assumptions in the 
search for solutions. Our hypotheses are based on the argument that – While it may be 
difficult to think under pressure, can sufficiently high competitive pressure trigger agents to 
think differently!  
We test these hypotheses using two experiments based on three common design 
principles. First, we use competitive pressure, as opposed to financial incentives, to induce 
increase in work effort. Research shows that agents improve performance in repeated tasks 
when they are presented with incentives (Hossain & List, 2012) as well as competitive 
pressures (Kuhnen & Tymula, 2012). While incentives appeals to the agents desire for a 
larger financial reward for performance, competitive pressures appeal to the agents’ self-
esteem and the desire of not falling behind peers. Recent evidence, from laboratory 
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experiments (Tafkov, 2013)  to field observations in various sectors from financial services 
(Gino & Staats, 2011)  to charities (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009), shows that competitive 
pressures can be a stronger trigger for increased work effort to achieve higher performance. 
Researchers go on to argue that small financial rewards for performance may in fact have a 
detrimental effect on increased effort (Gneezy & Rey‐Biel, 2014), as agents may perceive 
accepting financial reward to work harder dilutes their social image amongst peers (Ariely et 
al., 2009). As we use laboratory experiments, in which we could only offer small financial 
rewards to the participants, we decided not to use any financial incentives for performance 
but rely only on competitive pressure to increase work effort (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000).  
Second, we assume that when agents increase work effort, they can choose to increase 
both labour effort and cognitive effort, as there is no apparent trade-off (Kocher & Sutter, 
2006). Furthermore, our tasks are designed in such a way so as to eliminate any possible 
conflict between the two efforts. The repeated task, just like real-world production activities, 
is punctuated by gaps where agents are not engaged in any production activity that requires 
labour effort. In such cases, the increase in cognitive effort would be applied in-between the 
production activities and observed in the changes implemented in the production activity (e.g. 
redesigning routines), where as any increase in pure labour effort would be observed in the 
execution of the production activity (e.g. working faster with the same routines). Similarly, 
the novel task, much like real-world tasks that have a clear mandate for inventions, requires 
the agents to find a new solution that indicates application of cognitive effort. Agents may 
also choose to solve the problem using purely labour effort (e.g. random trial and error) 
however, the chance of success with such an approach is quite low and unlikely to be 
pursued. We discuss the tasks in detail in the experiment section.    
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Third, we run our experiment in teams, for two reasons. First, this is to come closer to 
the real-world scenarios where most tasks, both repeated and novel, are executed in teams. 
Even lab experiments involving organisational routines in repeated tasks, are often designed 
around teams of agents working towards the same objective (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). 
Second, as we do not use any financial incentives to induce work effort, we are keen to 
reduce the noise from individual motivation issues. In a recent study Mas and Moretti (2009) 
present evidence to show that individual agents are likely to increase work effort to perform 
well when they work with co-workers.  
In the following sections we present and then discuss the evidence from two 
laboratory experiments to show that in repeated tasks under low competitive pressure, agents 
are more likely to rely on known techniques and labour effort to improve performance. 
However, under high competitive pressure, agents increase cognitive effort and search for 
new techniques to improve performance. In novel tasks, where participants must rely on 
cognitive effort to perform, groups under high competitive pressure are more likely to apply 
cognitive effort to question implicit assumptions in their search for novel solutions. These 
results indicate that the presence of suitably high competitive pressure may frame agents to 
apply increased cognitive effort i.e. work smarter by questioning explicit and implicit routine 
assumptions that might otherwise limit performance. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of these results on our understanding of when agents choose to increase labour 
effort and cognitive effort as well as on the design of tasks used in laboratory experiments. 
 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 1: USING A REPEATED TASK 
Our first experiment uses a repeated task to test the relationship between competitive pressure 
and performance through increased work effort. In repeated tasks, agents rely on implicit and 
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explicit routines that store procedural knowledge that enable them to perform the task 
repeatedly, without rethinking about the procedural logic over and over again (Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994). Therefore, the use of established routines economises on the cognitive 
effort needed to execute the task, but focuses the agent’s attention on productivity 
improvements through increased labour effort. However, a sufficiently high competitive 
pressure may trigger agents to question the underlying routines and search for better 
techniques, indicating an increase in cognitive effort. Our hypotheses for repeated tasks are: 
H1: In repeated tasks 
 (a)Under low competitive pressure, agents are more likely to increase labour effort 
over cognitive effort to improve performance 
 (b)High competitive pressure is likely to induce agents to increase cognitive effort to 
find new techniques for improving performance 
 
3.3.1 REPEATED TASK 
The repeated task used in experiment 1 is an adaptation of a Number Reduction Task (NRT) 
(Wagner, Gais, Haider, Verleger, & Born, 2004). The objective of the task is to generate 
solutions for a series of NRTs using certain decision rules that act like routine production 
techniques. In this task, groups of participants can choose to complete the task through labour 
effort, using the knowledge of the rules already given to them (i.e. working harder), or by 
more labour and cognitive effort by creating new knowledge and applying new rules (i.e. 
working smarter).  
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Fig 3.1 The two ways of solving a NRT 
(i) Left side shows how to solve the NRT by sequentially executing the task using the two 
known rules (ii) Right side shows how to solve the NRT by using the two known rules and by 
creating a third new rule   
 
 
The stated objective of each Number Reduction Task (NRT) is to find the ‘last number’ of a 
sequence from a given sequence. Each NRT comprises of the digits ‘1’, ‘4’, and ‘9’. 
Participants can find the last number by sequentially processing the digits pairwise from left 
to right, according to two simple rules that are (i) the ‘same rule’, which states that the result 
of two identical digits is the same digit (for example, ‘4’ and ‘4’ results in ‘4’, as shown in 
the first response in Fig 3.1). (ii) The ‘different rule’, which states that the result of two non-
identical digits is the remaining third digit of this three-digit system (for example, ‘1’ and ‘4’ 
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results in ‘9’ as shown in the second response Fig 3.1). After the first response, comparisons 
are made between the preceding result and the next digit. The seventh response indicates the 
last number of the new sequence. Instructions given to the participants stated that only the 
last number was to be determined and this can be done at any time.  
What is not mentioned to the participants is that the NRT sequences were generated in 
such a way that the last three responses of the new sequence always mirrored the previous 
three responses. This implies that in every NRT, the second response coincides with the last 
response. In the example,, it is ‘9’ as shown by the arrow in Fig 3.1. Teams that gain insight 
into this hidden rule abruptly cut short the sequential process by identifying the solution 
immediately after the second response. Right panel of Fig. 3.1 illustrates the two possible 
ways of solving the NRT (i) Using the two decision rules that are part of the initial briefing 
and (ii) Using the two decision rules and creating a third new rule; based on the insight that 
second and last number of the new sequence are always the same. Using the third hidden rule, 
participants can solve each NRT in three steps as opposed to the usual seven steps, thereby 
improving their productivity by at least two-folds. 
 
3.3.2 PROCEDURE 
The experiment was run with participants at three executive education workshops. We 
followed the recommendations of designing extra-laboratory experiments to collect data from 
classroom participants (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2013; Loyd, Kern, & Thompson, 2005). 
The exercise was used as an introductory exercise in workshops on break-through thinking in 
2012 and 2013. Over the three cohorts, 33 groups with six participants in each group i.e. 198 
individuals participated in the exercise. We had four groups with less than six participants 
whose response has not been counted in this study. The average age of the participants was 
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35 years with an average work experience of 11 years and 24% of the participants were 
women. The participants were randomly pre-assigned to 33 groups as was the experiment 
condition. Participants were informed that data collected during the exercise would be used in 
research, it is anonymous at the individual level, and that their participation in the exercise is 
voluntary. Summary statistics from the exercise was shared and discussed with the 
participants during the course of the workshop.  
When the participants assembled in the class they were given the same initial briefing. 
This included the briefing for informed consent, introduction to the NRT, a practice round 
with five NRTs to ensure that everyone was aware of how to apply the two rules to solve the 
NRT and logistical information. Each group was told that they would be given 70 NRT 
sequences and their team’s performance would be measured by the number of sequences they 
correctly solve in 60 seconds. They had to agree on a target for their team and an overall 
approach to meet whatever target they set out to achieve. They were informed that the task 
would be repeated three times and at the end of each round they would be given feedback on 
their performance. They were also told that there would be a ten-minute break, in-between 
rounds, during which they would have to respond to a short survey and that they were free to 
use the rest of the time to rethink their strategy if needed. During the course of the exercise 
they were told not to communicate with the ‘outside world’ and stay in their assigned room. 
The teams were then assigned separate rooms with a moderator assigned to each room.  
At the end of every round, the groups were asked to fill out a short survey to capture 
their response to the task on stress, perceived self-confidence, and perceived importance of 
the goal. Stress was measured using an adapted three item scale (α = 0.91) used by Bowman 
and Wittenbaum (2012) to measure stress felt by participants, after they have participated in a 
group exercise to execute a task under time pressure. Perceived self-confidence at the given 
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task was measured by an adapted three item scale (α = 0.70) used by Anderson (2004), while 
perceived importance of the goal was measured by a three item scale (α = 0.61) that was 
adapted from Butler (1993). Participants rated each item on a seven point scale (1 = Not at all 
true to 7 = Very true). 
 
3.3.3 COMPETITIVE PRESSURE TO SET HIGH ASPIRATION  
In this task, time (i.e. 60 seconds in each round) and labour (i.e. six participants per team) 
serve as constraints in resources while competitive pressure is manipulated by providing 
performance feedback (Lant, 1992). Regardless of the group’s actual performance, at the 
conclusion of round 1 and 2, the control groups were informed that their performance was 
“very good compared to the other groups” whereas the experiment groups were informed that 
their performance was “very poor as most other groups had solved all 70 sequences”. Fig 3.2 
summarises the overall design of the experiment.  
Fig 3.2: Experimental design for repeated task 
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3.3.4 OBSERVATIONS  
Observation 1 (a): Fig 3.3 shows that the performance of the control groups (i.e. groups with 
low competitive pressure) improved over the three rounds. Table 3.1 shows that only 28% of 
these groups gained insight into the hidden rule, indicating that a majority of the groups relied 
solely on labour effort to improve performance.  
Observation 1 (b): From Fig 3.3 we find that the experiment groups (i.e. groups with high 
competitive pressure) performed better than the control groups and Table 3.1 shows that this 
is because 87% of the experiment groups found the insight into the hidden rule. This indicates 
that the experiment groups applied more cognitive effort to search for a better technique to 
meet the competitive pressure. The stock lines of the experiment group indicate that the 
variance in performance amongst the experiment groups was lower compared to the control 
groups.      
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Fig 3.3: Performance of control and experiment groups  
Bars indicate the mean performance and the stock lines represent the maximum, 75th 
percentile, 25th percentile, and minimum values within a group. N = 18 for control groups and 
N = 15 for experiment groups  
 
Table 3.1: Evidence of cognitive effort as observed in the discovery of the new, hidden 
rule in experiment and control groups 
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Figs 3.4 (a) (b) and (c) show the average stress, self-confidence and perceived 
importance of the task, over the three rounds, for the two groups. We observe that after the 
second round, when most experiment groups had found the hidden rule, the average stress 
dropped and self-confidence increased. Surprisingly, however, the average stress shot up and 
self-confidence dropped in the final round. In a discussion with the participants after the 
results were shared, we learnt that in the final round the participants of the experiment groups 
were aiming for a perfect score (i.e. all correct NRTs) that caused a build-up of stress while 
undermining their confidence as they were not sure that they can avoid inadvertent errors 
under stress. The average perceived importance of the task was high and remained so 
throughout the three rounds for both the groups.       
Fig 3.4: Representation of the data collected from a survey of the participants  
(See appendix 8.4)  
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3.4 EXPERIMENT 2: USING A NOVEL TASK  
Our second experiment uses a novel task where agents must rely on cognitive effort to 
perform. In this experiment, we investigate if suitably high competitive pressure can induce 
agents to question the implicit routine assumptions within which they search for solutions. 
Our hypothesis for the novel task is:  
H2: In novel tasks,  
(i) Compared to low competitive pressure, high competitive pressure is more likely to 
induce agents to apply increased cognitive effort in questioning routine assumptions 
in search for solutions  
 
3.4.1 NOVEL TASK 
The novel task used in experiment 2 is a problem solving task. Fig 3.5 describes the 
instructions given to the participants. The stated performance objective of the task is to find 
as many unique solutions as possible in ten minutes.  
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Fig 3.5: Novel task description 
You are part of an engineering team at a manufacturing firm. Your task today is to find 
different ways to cut a square metal plate into four equal parts such that the four pieces can be 
stacked up on top of each other perfectly. Slicing on the thin edge is not possible and no 
waste is allowed! For example, the dotted lines in the following diagram show one way to cut 
the metal plate into four equal parts. 
 
Your objective is to find as many unique solutions as possible in ten minutes.  
Instruction given only to the control groups:  Most teams typically find eight solutions (i.e. 
eight unique ways to cut the square metal piece) to this problem. 
Instruction given only to the experiment groups: Most teams typically find hundreds of 
different solutions (i.e. 100+ unique ways to cut the square metal piece) to this problem. 
The novel task has two solution states. Most groups are able to find the four standard 
solutions as shown in Fig 3.6 (a). Any variants of these solutions are not considered as unique 
solutions. However, Fig 3.6 (b) shows the possibility of generating infinitely many unique 
solutions once agents are able to see through the implicit assumptions and realise that the cuts 
do not have to start and end from key points (e.g. corners or midpoints) or that the cuts do not 
have to be in straight lines. 
97 
Fig 3.6: Solutions to the novel task 
   
3.4.2 PROCEDURE 
The experiment was run with participants at an MBA workshop on innovative thinking. As in 
experiment 1, we followed the recommendations of designing extra-laboratory experiments 
to collect data from classroom participants (Charness et al., 2013; Loyd et al., 2005). Twenty 
groups with six participants in each group i.e. 120 individuals participated in the exercise. 
Results of groups with less than six participants have not been counted in this study. The 
average age of the participants was 30 years; with an average work experience of six years 
and 28% of the participants were women. The participants were randomly pre-assigned to the 
groups as was the treatment condition. Participants were informed that data collected during 
the exercise would be used in research, it is anonymous at the individual level, and that their 
participation in the exercise is voluntary. Results from the exercise was shared and discussed 
with the participants during the course of the workshop.  
Each team was assigned to a room. When the team was assembled and seated, a 
moderator gave out one sheet with the task description and one sheet for the participants to 
note down the solutions. The moderator was instructed not to give any further guidance on 
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the subject, to keep time (i.e. ten minutes), and to ensure participants do not leave the room or 
communicate with the ‘outside world’ during the exercise.  
 
3.4.3 COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
In this exercise time constraint (i.e. 10 mins) and group size (i.e. 6 individuals) serve as 
constraints. Competitive pressure was manipulated by informing the groups about ‘typical’ 
performance of other groups. The instructions to the control groups included a highlighted 
line stating that “most teams typically find eight solutions (i.e. eight unique ways to cut the 
square metal piece) to this problem”, whereas the instructions to the experiment groups 
included a line stating that “most teams typically find hundreds of different solutions (i.e. 
100+ unique ways to cut the square metal piece) to this problem”. 
 
3.4.4 OBSERVATIONS 
Results from experiment 2 are shown in Table 3.2. The experiment groups were more likely 
to improve performance by questioning routine assumptions. While 44% of the experiment 
groups (compared to 27% of the control groups) found insight into the better way of 
generating solutions, this effect was not found to be significant.   
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Table 3.2: Impact of competitive pressure on performance though increased cognitive 
effort in questioning routine assumptions in a novel task.
 
3.5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Our study has two key implications. First, we show that performance under competitive 
pressure (high aspiration) can improve due to increased labour effort or increased cognitive 
effort. In the case of repeated tasks, agents show a preference to improve performance though 
labour effort (working harder) under low competitive pressure while under high competitive 
pressure, the increased cognitive effort (working smarter) is directed towards searching for 
new techniques to improve performance. Similarly in novel tasks, under competitive pressure 
the increased cognitive effort to improve performance is likely to challenge implicit 
assumptions used in framing the search for solutions. This indicates that high competitive 
pressure may frame agents to apply increased cognitive effort i.e. working smarter by 
questioning explicit and implicit routine assumptions that might otherwise limit performance. 
Second, many experimental designs that require participants to execute certain tasks 
repeatedly may be inadvertently introducing learning effects. On the one hand such a learning 
effect may inflate both absolute performance and predictability of outcomes, it may also 
introduce bias against change to another procedure especially under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty.  
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We would like to highlight that our observations are limited to competitive pressure 
as a mechanism to set high aspiration and are not generalizable to any or all pressures. 
Competitive pressure clearly works by appealing to an agents’ desire of doing better than the 
benchmark set by their peers. Work effort induced by such a mechanism is motivated by the 
aspiration that ‘it is possible to meet the target as others have done it’. On the other hand, 
pressure mechanisms like time pressure may not adequately inspire the same aspiration. To 
that extent we do not advocate a ‘creativity under the gun’ approach in organisations 
(Amabile, Hadley, & Kramer, 2002). Clearly more research to understand the psychological 
implications of pressure to perform is needed. The main argument of the paper is to show the 
possibility of finding ingenious insights into novel techniques that improve performance in 
both repeated and novel tasks may be triggered by competitive pressure.   
Key contributions: In this essay, we design two experiments to test the relationship 
between high competitive pressure and performance through the increase in labour effort 
(working harder) and cognitive effort (working smarter) in (a) repeated task and (b) novel 
task. In repeated tasks, we find that under low competitive pressure agents are more likely to 
rely on labour effort to improve performance, indicating a preference towards labour effort. 
However, under high competitive pressure, agents increase cognitive effort and search for 
new techniques to improve performance. In novel tasks, where participants must rely on 
cognitive effort to perform, we find that groups under high competitive pressure are more 
likely to apply cognitive effort to question implicit assumptions in their search for novel 
solutions. These results indicate that high competitive pressure may frame agents to apply 
increased cognitive effort i.e. work smarter by questioning explicit and implicit routine 
assumptions that might otherwise limit performance. 
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From a behavioural theory perspective, our aim was to go deeper i.e. to the micro 
level and understand how agents respond to mismatch in performance and aspiration. 
Behavioural theorists suggest that when there is a mismatch between aspiration and 
performance organizational decision makers will respond to bridge the gap. However, it is 
not clear how they choose to bridge the gap. For instance do they commit more resources to 
solve the problem or do decision makers rethink the problem. This essay aims to make a 
contribution to this discussion by showing that decision makers have a preference to commit 
resources without rethinking the underlying assumptions of the problem. Furthermore, we 
show that there comes a point in the decision making logic where decision makers realize that 
increasing resources (i.e. labour effort) would not be sufficient to meet the performance 
aspiration – that may lead agents to apply increased cognitive effort to rethink the problem.   
In the final essay, we aim to extrapolate this micro level decision to adopt new 
routines and observe how the decision to adopt new routines diffuses in a population of firms 
that are engaged in competition with each other to varying degrees? Put differently, we would 
expect that the variance in perception of competitive pressure, across a population of firms, to 
be a determinant of the adoption decision. We propose to test this idea in the next essay.   
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4. CHOOSING WHICH BATTLES TO FIGHT:  AN ATTENTION-BASED ARGUMENT FOR THE 
DIFFUSION OF A ROUTINE AS A COMPETITIVE ACTION 
 
 
“If we can keep our competitors focused on us while we stay focused on the customer, 
ultimately we'll turn out all right” 
- Jeff Bezos  
Quote from “One Click: Jeff Bezos and the Rise of Amazon.com” by 
Richard L. Brandt 
 
In this essay our interest is to understand how routines diffuse in an industry. Specifically, we 
study when do firms decide to adopt a routine as a response to rivals’ actions of adopting the 
same routine. Diffusion of competitive actions like adoption of new routines is often viewed 
to be driven by a combination of two forces that are explained by (i) rivalry-based theories 
that propose firms are motivated to respond to competitive threats and (ii) information-based 
theories that propose firms are motivated to respond once they have access to information 
about the routine. Based on this view, it would seem that firms with greater threat perception 
and greater scope to gather information would be the early movers.  
We argue that this analysis does not account for the mechanisms by which a firm 
would distribute its limited attention towards information from different competitors. This 
has particular significance for firms engaged in competition across multiple markets and 
business domains (multipoint competition) as these firms are likely to allocate more attention 
to information from major competitors than minor ones. Moreover, when a firm is engaged in 
competition with many players (as opposed to few) its limited attention is also distributed 
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across many players. In essence, engaging in multipoint competition with many plays can 
potentially reduce the attention allocated to the moves of any one player.  
Drawing on the literature on attention-based view of strategy formulation and Chen & 
Miller’s AMC model of competitive dynamics (Chen & Miller, 2012), we propose an 
attention-based diffusion model for the spread of a routine throughout an industry. Using an 
agent-based simulation, we then estimate the characteristics of early and late adopters of a 
new routine in such a system. We propose that (i) early adopters of a new routine are more 
likely to be firms with a small reference group and high rivalry, while (ii) firms with large 
reference groups and low rivalry are least likely to be early adopters. We then illustrate this 
attention-based diffusion mechanism with data from the adoption of a new software delivery 
technology called Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) by packaged-software firms from 2002 - 
2012.  
 
  
104 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
What drives the adoption of routines (as capabilities) in an industry where firms are engaged 
in multipoint competition? Over the past couple of decades the main predictions of multipoint 
competition theory have been tested across various markets such as airlines (Gimeno, 1999; 
Gimeno & Woo, 1996), financial services (Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Haveman & 
Nonnemaker, 2000), hotels (Fernandez & Marin, 1998), hospitals (Stephan, Murmann, 
Boeker, & Goodstein, 2003), and computer software (Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 
2000).  Scholars have long argued that in a multipoint competitive system widespread 
adoption of the same routines (i.e. imitation) is driven by a combination of two explanatory 
factors:  (i) rivalry-based theories that see firms as motivated to respond to competitive 
threats (Baum & Korn, 1996; Livengood & Reger, 2010) and (ii) information-based theories 
that see firms as basing their response on information that points to the benefits of adopting a 
routine (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; McCardle, 1985; Swanson & Ramiller, 2004). In essence 
these views suggest that while multipoint competitive rivalry is constant, firms pay special 
attention to moves by major rivals that disproportionally affect key market segments, and the 
decision to adopt new routine is triggered as firms scan their competitive environment for 
information about the benefits of the new routine.    
At first sight, this would suggest that firms are more likely to be early movers if their 
perception of threats posed by rivals, and the scope of their scanning activities, is greater than 
other firms in the same industry. The attention-based perspective of strategy formulation 
would suggest that this analysis ignores the influence of limited attention resources on how 
firms interpret threats and process information. At a deeper level, this means that the current 
view of multipoint competition does not take into account the mechanisms by which firms 
distribute their limited attention when confronting different types of competitors (Ocasio, 
1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). This is precisely the situation that normally occurs when firms 
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are engaged in competition across multiple markets. In these situations firms are likely to 
allocate more attention to adoption decisions (as well as non-adoption decisions) of a routine 
by a major competitor than a minor competitor. Also from an attention-based perspective, 
when a firm is engaged in competition with many players as opposed to few, its threat 
interpretation and information processing are likely to be less effective since it must 
distribute its attention resources across many players. Allocating attention resources is even 
more challenging when we consider the fact that the number of firms in a particular industry 
may increase, and that firms can also expand their product line, posing a threat in an 
increasing number of market segments. Adoption decisions in this dynamic context are likely 
to stretch the firm’s attention resources even further, reducing its ability to interpret threats 
and gather reliable information.   
Take for instance the case of adoption of ‘voice recognition’ capabilities by 
manufacturers of consumer devices. Even though the basic technology has been around for 
some time12, it received mainstream attention only when Apple acquired Siri in 2010 and 
launched it as a standard feature in its iPhones in 2011. Competitors’ response to the 
introduction of Siri in consumer devices varied significantly. Google, which competes against 
Apple in this market with its Android operating system, and Nexus range of devices, 
responded almost immediately by launching voice search applications for Android devices. In 
2011, Google’s executive chairman and former CEO, Eric Schmidt, conceded that Apple’s 
Siri voice controlled personal assistant could pose a ‘competitive threat’ to Google’s core 
                                                             
12
 “Audrey” the first voice recognition software was developed in 1952 by Bell Laboratories. This was capable 
of recognising digits spoken by a single voice. In 1962, IBM demonstrated the “Shoebox” that could recognise a 
few English words. Progress in this field picked up with major funding from the US Department of Defence and 
in 1976 a research team at Carnegie Mellon developed a system called “Happy” that could recognise more than 
1000 words, considered to be the vocabulary of an average three year old. Automated speech recognition 
became commercially available in the 1990s with the launch of “Dragon Dictate”, priced at an incredible 
US$9000. However by 1997, “Dragon NaturallySpeaking” priced at US$695 can be considered to be the first 
modern voice recognition technology that could understand continuous speech at about 100 words per minute 
after the user had to spend about 45 minutes to train the software. See Juang, B., & Rabiner, L. R. 2005. 
Automatic speech recognition–a brief history of the technology development. Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Atlanta Rutgers University and the University of California. Santa Barbara, 1. For more details.  
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search business and therefore they had to respond with urgency. On the other hand, consider 
the adoption decision by Amazon that competes across a wide variety of markets like online 
retail, on-demand entertainment, and infrastructure services, and Microsoft that completes 
across different markets like office productivity software, video games, and enterprise 
applications. Amazon made its competitive move much later in 2013, when it announced the 
acquisition of Ivona Software, a small technology firm specializing in bespoke text-to-speech 
functionality for its Kindle range of devices. Similarly, Microsoft that also competes with 
Apple and Google in the mobile operating systems market with Windows mobile adopted a 
similar technology called ‘Cortana’ in 2014. Could the fact that Amazon and Microsoft also 
compete across a wide range of different markets have played a role in the decision to adopt 
the technology later? As in the case of Google, Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft in any 
industry rivals confront each other across multiple market segments, with greater presence in 
some segments as opposed to others.   
In this essay, our aim is to use the attention-based perspective in order to explore how 
firms that are engaged in multipoint competition respond to the adoption (or non-adoption) 
decisions of rivals. Our starting point is the observation that firms in multipoint competition 
not only have to deal with rivals whose product lines overlap theirs, but also that some of 
these firms overlap more than others. In other words, that there is a variance in the level of 
portfolio overlap and the number of overlapping firms. To examine this in depth, we consider 
the adoption of a new set of routines that constitute a new technology as a competitive action. 
Thus, the adoption, of a new technological feature or new production techniques, is seen as 
an identifiable ‘competitive action’. Furthermore, this competitive action is an externally 
directed, specific, and observable competitive move initiated by a firm to enhance its relative 
competitive position, (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001). Such competitive actions can include 
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“new product introductions or advertising campaigns, entry into new markets, changes in 
pricing policy, and relocation or redesign of facilities” (Chen & Miller, 2012: 138).  
This essay is structured as follows. We first develop a diffusion model of the spread 
of a technology that is based on firms’ perception of competitive threats. We draw on the 
attention-based theory of strategic decision making (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005), 
and Attention Motivation Capability (AMC) model in competitive dynamics (Chen & Miller, 
2012), to build a diffusion model of the spread of a technology in an industry. Using this 
model, we run simulations to study when different types of firms choose to respond to a 
competitive threat, with particular focus on the characteristics of the early movers. We then 
illustrate this attention-based diffusion mechanism with data from the adoption of a new 
software delivery technology called Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) by packaged-software 
firms from 2002 - 2012. 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMING 
Levinthal (2011) has argued that the perception of an opportunity or threat from a 
competitor’s action is a behavioural act that is prone to perceptual variation. Through this 
behavioural lens “the properties of a firm such as propensity to act, responsiveness, execution 
speed, and action (or response) visibility are brought into focus” (Chen & Miller, 2012: 144). 
For a firm that is engaged in multiple markets and businesses, the perception of threats is 
represented though an attention-based mechanism (Ocasio, 1997) that builds ‘awareness’ of 
some threats more than others at the corporate level. Such heterogeneity in awareness of a 
competitive threat is built as a combination of two factors.  
First, if a competitor’s move to introduce new technology impacts a large part of the 
focal firm’s market portfolio, it is likely to receive more attention than a competitive move 
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that impacts a small part of the portfolio. Baum and Korn (1996) called this the ‘market 
domain overlap’. Threats to a larger market domain overlap are perceived as an 
encroachment on the firm’s ‘turf’, or overall industry position (Livengood & Reger, 2010). 
Therefore not only do such threats get more attention from the firm, but the response is also 
prioritized, and hence more likely to elicit a response. Taking the enterprise software industry 
as an example, when Oracle acquired Hyperion in 2007 with the intention of boosting its 
Business Intelligence (BI) technology; Oracle’s main competitors SAP and IBM responded 
by acquiring Business Objects and Cognos respectively in less than a year.  
Second, as the profitability of a new technology is rarely known, firms can arrive at a 
more accurate calculation of the cost/benefit analysis of adopting this new technology by 
observing the behaviour of other firms in their industry (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; 
McCardle, 1985; Swanson & Ramiller, 2004). By the same token, a firm is likely to pay more 
attention to a competitive move adopted by many firms in the industry, as opposed to a few 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Greve, 1998). For instance, Giachetti and Lampel (2010) 
observe that mobile phone manufacturers not only respond to the competitive moves of 
strong rivals (e.g. market leader) but also react to the market average i.e. the collective 
product decisions of industry rivals. The reference group that attract attention comprise of 
firms with which the focal firm has a market domain overlap. Groups of both high and low 
competitive rivalry firms are subsets of the reference group. In addition, the size of the 
reference group is important. The larger the reference group, the more data becomes available 
that the firm can profitably analyse.   
To sum up, a firm’s awareness of threat is built through a combination of (a) the size 
of the market domain overlap i.e. strength of  rivalry and (b) the number of competitors 
imposing the threat i.e. the size of the reference group. When interpreting how such threats 
are interpreted, it is important to note that firm A, observing threat from firm B, can arrive at 
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a different threat perception than firm B, observing firm A. In other words, as depicted in Fig 
4.1 the competitive relationship between two firms, based on the above conceptualization of 
awareness, is asymmetrical (Chen, 1996).  
Fig 4.1: Representation of asymmetric competitive relationship in multipoint 
competition 
 
Given asymmetric perception, how does a firm respond to a threat? Chen and Miller 
(2012) argue that the response to a threat is a combination of motivation and capability. They 
point out that the firm’s motivation to respond is dependent on various factors including 
market domain overlap (Baum & Korn, 1996), the nature of the competitive action, i.e. its 
irreversibility (Chen, Venkataraman, Sloan Black, & MacMillan, 2002), and micro-factors 
such as top management team characteristics (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996). On the other 
hand, the capability to respond is dependent on a variety of micro- and macro-factors that 
impact the availability of suitable organisational resources and capabilities. Micro-factors 
include externally derived resources such as network positions (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), 
whereas macro-factors include the firm’s internal resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991). 
Since responding is costly and risky, a firm’s willingness to respond is constrained, and will 
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only take place if motivation and capability exceed a certain threshold. The propensity to 
respond to a competitive threat is therefore a dichotomous variable i.e. respond or do not 
respond at any given time (Chen & Miller, 2012). By aggregating the dichotomous response 
of all firms in a given time period, we can observe the rate of adoption of the new technology 
in the industry. Furthermore, we can observe the diffusion patterns and the characteristics of 
early adopters.      
Diffusion of new technologies has long attracted considerable interest from 
organisational scholars. The basic premise of diffusion studies is that certain firm 
characteristics increase, or decrease, the likelihood of adoption of features from the 
environment in which it operates (Rogers, 1983; Strang & Macy, 2001). With the exception 
of the diffusion of normative practices (Fiss & Zajac, 2004), researchers tend to argue that 
firms adopt new features due to a combination of economics of competitive advantage, or  
social reasons, specifically the search for greater legitimacy in their operating environment 
(Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999; Katz & Shapiro, 1987). For instance, Kennedy and Fiss 
(2009) show that in US hospitals the motivation to implement Total Quality Management 
(TQM) practices were a mix of seeking better quality competitiveness, and the crucial 
importance of increasing legitimacy for changes in the medical community. 
Empirical evidence shows that that diffusion of new features at the population level 
follows a contagion model (Garud, Tuertscher, & Van de Ven, 2013). Such models are 
represented by sigmoid functions and form “S” shaped diffusion curves that have three 
central features. First, the initial adoption of the feature is relatively limited and flat. Second, 
this is followed by rapid adoption by the majority of population, often termed as the ‘tipping 
point’. Third and finally, the diffusion curve flattens as it reaches saturation in the market.  In 
this paper our interest is to study the early stages of the diffusion pattern along the 
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dimensions of (a) the size of the market domain overlap i.e. strength of rivalry, and (b) the 
number of competitors imposing the threat i.e. the reference group impact adoption. 
Rivalry-based theories would suggest that firms with higher market domain overlap 
and thus higher levels of rivalry, would be early adopters. Similarly, information-based 
theories would suggest that firms with a larger number of rivals i.e. a larger reference group, 
would be early adopters as they are more likely to get access to the information early. Based 
on the combination of the information- and rivalry-based theories, we would expect that firms 
with high rivalry and larger reference groups would be the early adopters of a new 
technology, whereas firms with low rivalry and small reference group will be late movers.    
We also have intermediate situations where firms have high rivalry and large reference group, 
and large reference group and low rivalry. In general, we would expect firms with large 
reference group to have access to information from more sources than a firm with small 
reference group, and given the greater amount of information these firms have access to, they 
are able to act more quickly when they perceive a competitive threat. For this reason, as 
shown in Fig 4.2, we would expect category C to be early adopters and category A to be late 
adopters.  
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Fig 4.2: Categorisation of firms engaged in multipoint competition within an industry 
based on (i) The strength of competitive rivalry, and (ii) The size of the reference group 
 
 
 
Attention-based theory makes different predictions about how the four types of firms, 
outlined above, will react. A large reference group indicates that the limited attention 
resources of the firm would also be ‘spread’ throughout the reference group. This means that 
a firm with a large reference group would pay less attention to a competitive threat from 
another firm than a firm with a small reference group, given that both have the same market 
domain overlap with the competitor. Furthermore, the benefits of the adoption of the new 
technology are uncertain when we bear in mind that the absence of the adoption in the 
reference group is not the same as the absence of information. The fact that some firms in the 
reference group do not adopt a particular technology may indicate that the technology is 
difficult to implement, or is not that attractive to consumers. Based on this reasoning, we 
would expect firms in category D to be early movers, and category B to be late movers.   
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4.3 AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL OF ATTENTION-BASED MULTIPOINT 
COMPETITION 
 
We use an agent-based simulation model with interactions between multiple firms engaged in 
multipoint competition, to understand how the adoption of a technology would diffuse in an 
industry. To construct the model, we make two simplifying assumptions about the adoption 
of the technology. First, we assume that all firms adopt the same technology, and the 
technology does not change over time. Second, we assume that firms will only pay attention 
to the moves of other firms when they have a market domain overlap with these firms. In our 
simulation we keep the market domain overlap constant over time.   
 We model the decision to adopt a new technology as a dichotomous variable A, that is 
1 if the technology is adopted by firm i in time t, and zero otherwise. The decision to adopt is 
a function of the strength of rivalry due to adoption by competition (Competitive threat) S, 
the proportion of adoptions in the reference set (information uncertainty) N and an arbitrary 
variable that denotes the firm’s capabilities C. The function is represented as follows: 
 
 ……… (1) 
 
We setup the simulation with a population of 100 firms that are engaged in competition 
across multiple markets and businesses. The overlap of the portfolio between two firms is 
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. Any overlap of less than 0.1 
was converted to 0. The overlap is assumed to be constant over the time period. We then 
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categorise each firm in the industry as High/Low based on the mean across the two 
dimensions i.e. average of the domain overlap with other firms and number of overlapping 
firms. Fig 4.3 shows the categories and the number of firms in each category. We then 
simulated the diffusion of a single competitive action, introduced at a single firm at t = 1, 100 
times for each firm as the initial adopter, thereby leading to a total of 10,000 iterations of 
diffusion. 
Fig: 4.3 Categorisation of the firms in the simulation  
based on (a) the size of the reference group, and (b) the strength of rivalry 
 
Fig 4.4 shows the average diffusion pattern of the technology over ten time periods. 
As expected, the pattern is sigmoid in nature with three clear stages (Rogers, 1983). The first 
stage comprises of innovators and early adopters (Stages 1 – 3), followed by the majority 
(Stages 4 – 6) and finally the laggards (Stages 7 onwards). In our subsequent discussion of 
the outcomes, we will split the ten time periods according to these three stages. 
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Fig 4.4: Overall diffusion pattern  
 
In this attention-based mechanism of diffusion of the technology, we would expect 
the starting point i.e. the ‘innovator’ to influence how far the technology diffuses in the 
industry. Specifically, if the innovator is involved in competition with many players in the 
industry, then on an average we would expect more players to adopt the technology than if 
the starting point was competition with only with a few players. This leads us to the first 
proposition:     
 
Proposition 1: Expected number of adopters of a new technology is more 
when the initiating firm has a larger reference group (Categories C and B) 
 
This is represented in the simulation results shown in Fig 4.5. When we take a closer look at 
the diffusion pattern, separated by the starting point, we find that on average the technology 
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is expected to diffuse further when the innovator is in categories C and B i.e. for firms with a 
large reference group.  
Fig 4.5: Overall diffusion pattern separated by starting condition  
 
Next we turn our attention to early adopters (time periods 1 – 3). When we consider 
how a firm’s limited attention resources are distributed as it engages in multipoint 
competition, we find that having a larger reference set may reduce the attention allocated to 
any one player. This combined with weak rivalry in the reference set, may reduce the threat 
perception of the firm especially in the early stages of the diffusion pattern. In contrast, when 
the firm has a small reference group, its attention is focused on the competitive moves of 
relatively few firms. Ceteris paribus, a firm with a small reference group would perceive 
greater threat from the adoption decision of competitors. Therefore, we have the next two 
propositions on the characteristics of early adopters:  
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Proposition 2 (a): Early adopters of a new technology are more likely to 
be firms with a small reference group and high rivalry (Category D) 
 
Proposition 2 (b): Early adopters of a new technology are least likely to 
be firms with large reference groups and low rivalry (Category B) 
 
Propositions 2(a) and (b) are represented in the simulation results shown in Fig 4.6 (a) 
and (b). Figure 4.6 (a) shows the proposition of adopters by categories in each time period. 
We find that in time period 2, almost 40% of the adopters were in category D whereas only 
11% were in category B. Fig 4.6 (b) shows the percentage of adopters by category for the 
first three time periods. In the starting time period each category has 1% share as the 
simulation is designed in such a way that every firm acts as the seed once. However, as we 
would expect in an attention-based mechanism, the most significant increase is seen in 
category D while the most significant drop is seen in category B.   
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Fig 4.6 Adoption pattern by categories  
(a): Proportion of adopters by category in each time period
 
Fig 4.6 (b): Percentage of adopters by category in each time period 
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When we combine the arguments from proposition 1 and 2 (a) we would expect that 
the adoption of the technology by the early adopters would be highest when the initiating 
firm has a large reference group. Therefore, we have a final proposition:  
Proposition 3: Firms with a small reference group and high rivalry 
(category D) would adopt the technology faster when the starting point 
is a firm with a large reference group (category B and C) 
 
Fig 4.7: Early stage adoption separated by starting category
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4.4 ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: DIFFUSION OF SAAS IN THE PACKAGED-SOFTWARE 
INDUSTRY 
 
To illustrate how diffusion of technology amongst firms engaged in multipoint competition in 
an industry is driven by an attention-based mechanism, we examine the adoption of Software 
as a Service (SaaS): a new delivery model in the packaged-software industry.  In this section, 
we will first briefly outline what is SaaS, how it is adopted, and why this is a suitable 
example to illustrate the diffusion of a technology. We will then discuss the data and 
descriptive results.  
 SaaS is essentially a new licencing and delivery model in which software is typically 
licenced to the customer on a subscription basis and provided in a hosted model i.e. the 
software code resides on the servers of the vendor and is accessed by the customer over the 
internet. To access the software customers typically install a very small piece of code on their 
devices that allows secure connection to the hosted service over a standard web browser. The 
basic technology of centralised hosting of business applications dates back to the 1960s, but 
the rapid growth of the internet and internet-based services during the 1990s brought about a 
new class of centralised computing technology firms called Application Service Providers 
(ASP). ASPs host and manage specialised business applications, with the goal of reducing 
costs through central administration. SaaS essentially extends the ASP model. The key 
difference is that while most initial ASPs focused on managing and hosting third-party or 
other software vendors' software, SaaS typically involves the vendor developing their own 
capabilities of delivering and managing their own software in this model.  
 For software firms to deliver its software in a SaaS model, it must be able to adopt the 
following changes to its production techniques. First, and foremost, the firm needs to make 
software architectural modifications. Most SaaS delivery models are based on a ‘multi-
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tenant’ architecture. Simply put, this architecture requires a single version of the software, 
with a single configuration (i.e. hardware, network, operating system), to be used for all 
customers or tenants. This puts tremendous limitations on the choices available to customers 
to customise the software to their unique needs. So why would customers want SaaS? That is 
where the other major change comes in i.e. the way the software is licenced to customer. In 
essence, because the design of SaaS implies that customers are sharing the software and the 
configurations (i.e. the hardware, network and operating system), the total cost of ownership 
of SaaS solutions is typically divided amongst all the customers. Furthermore, as customers 
have the option of ‘renting’ the software and infrastructure, they pay for the service by a 
subscription, therefore turning their IT expenses from capital to operational expenses. 
Therefore, to deliver SaaS, the vendor has to adopt a new licencing model that benefits the 
customer greatly because of its flexibility. The adoption of SaaS as a new delivery model (or 
an option) therefore provides a competitive advantage to players in the packages-software 
industry.  
 To summarize, the adoption of SaaS requires a firm to adopt at least two new sets of 
capabilities. The first is around the architecture that calls for a move towards a multi-tenant 
architecture, and the second around the licencing model that calls for a move towards 
subscription-based pricing. The development of these capabilities indicates that the firm 
adopts new routines often copied from competitors. Our interest is in understanding which 
firms adopted SaaS capabilities and when.  
 
4.4.1 DATA 
 
SaaS has seen a rise starting from the early 2002. In the packaged-software industry, 
Salesforce.com (founded in 1999) is often seen as the pioneer in SaaS. The term SaaS is 
122 
 
thought to have first appeared in an article called "Strategic Backgrounder: Software As A 
Service," internally published in February 2001 by the Software & Information Industry 
Association's (SIIA) eBusiness Division. We start our study period from 2002 considering 
that the only major SaaS provider in the packaged-software industry at that time was 
Salesforce.com. We track the new product offering of the top 50 packaged-software firms (as 
of 2012) from 2002 to 2012.  
 To analyse multipoint competition in this industry, we first look at how the size of the 
reference group and the strength of rivalry are estimated. We define software firms using the 
Thomson Reuters Business Classification system, under which Packaged Software firms 
(57201020) are treated separately from IT Services & Consulting firms (57201010). 
Therefore, a firm like Accenture that is purely into IT services would not be counted as a 
packaged software firm. In contrast, a firm like IBM is counted under packaged software as 
IBM does have software products, while a firm like SAP that is primarily into software 
products is also counted under packaged software. Based on this classification, we identified 
the top 50 firms by revenue as of 2012. We then collected data on all the major software 
product releases announced by these firms in the time period 2002 to 2012. Specifically, we 
looked for the first SaaS solution announced by a firm in this period.    
 
4.4.2 DESCRIPTION OF DIFFUSION OF SAAS 
 
Whenever a firm announces the launch of a product in the SaaS delivery and pricing model, 
the firm is coded to have adopted the capability required to deliver software in a SaaS model. 
Fig 4.8 shows the number of firms that had at least one product that was delivered to 
customers in a SaaS model.  
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Fig: 4.8 Diffusion of SaaS in the packaged-software industry  
(a): Diffusion of SaaS amongst top 50 packaged-software firms (2002 – 2012) 
 
Fig: 4.8 (b): Number of new firms offering at least one product in a SaaS model, 
amongst the top 50 packaged-software firms (2002 – 2012)
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From Fig 4.8 we make two observations. First, as expected, the diffusion of SaaS and 
a new software delivery model follows a sigmoid pattern. It has three distinct groups defined 
by the phases of adoption i.e. early adopters, followed by the majority that adopt the new 
routine in the growth phase, and finally the laggards. Second, even amongst the top 50 
packaged-software firms, there are a few firms that do not offer any of their software in the 
SaaS model. Given that the technology is now ubiquitous (i.e. information is widely 
available), it can be inferred that these firms do not perceive a strong competitive threat and 
hence have not decided to adopt the technology.   
 
4.4.3 DESCRIPTION OF DIFFUSION OF SAAS BASED ON CATEGORIES 
How does the adoption differ by the categories, based on the size of the reference group and 
the strength of rivalry? To address this question, we first classify the firms into categories 
based on: (i) The strength of competitive rivalry; and (ii) The size of the reference group. The 
categorisation was done independently by two experts with deep knowledge of the packaged-
software industry. There was a high degree of correlation (0.89) between the two expert’s 
choices of categorisation. Note that the categorization was done based on the present 
portfolio of the firms (i.e. as of 2012). To that extent it is assumed the category of the firm 
would not have changed in the study period. The final categorisation is depicted in Fig 4.9. 
 When we plot the diffusion pattern of the firms by category, we find that firms in 
category D were the earliest to adopt the new routines to deliver SaaS as shown in Fig 4.10. 
This is in line with the propositions of diffusion based on an attention-based mechanism 
when firms are engaged in multipoint competition. 
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Fig: 4.9 Categorisation of top 50 packaged software firms  
based on (i) The strength of competitive rivalry and (ii) The size of the reference group 
 
Fig 4.10: Adoption of SaaS amongst top 50 packaged-software firms by categories 
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4.5 DISCUSSION 
In this essay, we present an argument that competitive dynamics in multipoint competition is 
influenced by how the firm’s attention is directed towards some threats more than other. We 
propose that the firm’s limited attention resources are directed by two key variables. First, the 
market domain overlap with each firm (strength of rivalry), and second the number of 
overlapping firms (size of reference group). Using this argument we built an agent-based 
simulation model to estimate the diffusion of the decision to adopt a capability as a 
competitive action.  
The simulation diffusion pattern that emerges gives us insights into three areas. First, 
we find that the capability is likely to be adopted by more firms in the industry when the 
initiating firm has a larger reference group. Second, we find that the early adopters are most 
likely to be firms that have a small reference group and high rivalry, while the early adopters 
of the capability are least likely to be firms with large reference groups and low rivalry. 
Third, firms with small reference group and high rivalry, adopt fastest when the starting point 
is a firm with a large reference group.   
To understand this behaviour we must take into account how firms evaluate the risk of 
adopting and not adopting new capabilities. On the one hand, information-based theories 
suggest that firms adopt new capabilities when decision makers have access to information 
about the benefits of the capability. In essence, firms manage the risk of adopting new 
capabilities by gathering information from their reference group. While on the other hand, 
there is a risk of not adopting new technologies as competitive rivals may gain competitive 
advantage by adopting the capability sooner. When a firm has a large reference group it 
indicates the possibility of gathering more information to manage the risk of adopting. But at 
the same time, since the firm’s limited attention resources are spread across a larger reference 
group, it delays adoption thereby increasing the risk of not adopting. 
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This analysis also suggests that firms pay attention to both adoption and non-adoption 
decisions in the reference group. That is to say, the absence of adoption does not mean 
absence of information, but is a signal in its own right. This means that the focal firm’s 
calculation on whether to adopt the capability factors in the non-adoption decisions in the 
reference group. 
Our analysis clearly has some limitations. Our main objective is to derive some 
insights into how a capability would diffuse in an industry where firms are engaged in 
multipoint competition when driven by an attention-based mechanism. To build such a model 
we have made some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the capability remains 
constant over time and across firms. Second, we assume that motivation to adopt the 
capability is only driven by competitive rivalry and availability of information but is not 
influenced by intrinsic factors like firm-specific resources. Third, we assume that each firm 
adopts the capability and benefits from it equally. While these assumptions do not necessarily 
compromise our objective of generating patterns based on an attention-based mechanism, 
they clearly limit our ability to make any industry-specific predictions.    
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis produces patterns of diffusion that have been 
observed by other researchers. In particular, our model correctly predicts that the 
characteristics of early adopters in this industry, as firms that have a small reference group 
and high rivalry. Our model is also consistent with the adoption of Software as a Service 
(SaaS) in the packaged-software industry. Finally, our study points to the important role that 
attention-based mechanism plays in the diffusion of capabilities in an industry. This is a line 
of inquiry that we think holds great promise for further work on the interaction between 
managerial cognition, competitive dynamics, and the diffusion of innovations. 
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4.6 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
Our study has two key implications. First, we show that the present analysis of competitive 
dynamics in multipoint competition does not adequately account for the limited attention of 
decision makers when choosing to adopt one competitive action over another. Second, we 
show that once we take into consideration that attention of the decision maker is a limited 
resource, we find that the predicted characteristics of the early adopter changes.  
The main contribution of the essay is to argue that multipoint competition can be 
enriched by incorporating an attention based argument in the analysis of the diffusion of 
competitive actions. We show that the present theorization of information and competitive 
rivalry based theories of competitive dynamics in multipoint competition can benefit in its 
predictions by incorporating the attention based perspective. To conclude, we would like to 
reiterate the need to account for how the limited attention of firms is distributed when they 
engage in multipoint competition. Our central argument is that while it would seem to be 
based on rivalry-based and information-based theories, firms with high rivalry and large 
reference group would be the early adopters of new capabilities in an industry; an attention-
based view would suggest that early adopters are most likely to be firms that have a small 
reference group and high rivalry, while the early adopters of the capability are least likely to 
be firms with large reference groups and low rivalry. 
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5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
Each essay sheds new insight on our understanding of how organisational mandates, 
competitive pressure under constraints, and multipoint competition work as structural 
constraints. These structural constraints focus the attention of decision makers and enable 
them to filter though alternatives and make micro level choices to adopt or not to adopt 
routines. While this analysis opens up new areas of research, it is not without limitations. In 
this section we highlight some of these limitations and suggest how future research can 
possibly overcome these issues.    
In the first essay there are three key limitations. First, our design is purposefully 
deeper, as we aim to study the adoption and influence of the same routine on technological 
innovation. Future studies can potentially adopt a wider design, though it would be difficult 
as routines by nature are context specific. Future studies in this direction may want to relax 
the ‘black box’ approach in the capabilities tradition to incorporate a measure of variations in 
such a wider design. Second, we do not differentiate between the strength of routines. For 
instance, all the internal and external AC routines are assumed to have the same strength. 
While this has simplified our analysis to a great extent, future studies may want to develop a 
more nuanced approach by developing a scale. Finally, we consider all innovative outcomes 
to be the same. This approach captures the quantity of innovation but future studies may want 
to incorporate a measure of the quality of innovation as another dependent variable. 
The central limitation in the second essay is that our design studies one specific 
condition i.e. high aspiration under resource constraints, and the influence if this condition on 
the incidence of new routine generation. Further studies may want to expand the argument to 
other conditions. Another potential area of study would be to analyse the process of new 
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routine generation as well as the outcome. For instance, what is the influence of certain 
individual performing a role e.g. leadership or the influence of restricted communication 
within the group on its decision to search.  
The final essay lays the foundation for an attention-based argument for the diffusion 
of routines as a competitive action when firms are engaged in multipoint competition. To 
build this theoretical model we have made some restrictive assumptions that may be relaxed 
in future iterations. These assumptions are about the adoption of the routine. First, we assume 
that all firms adopt the same routines, and the routine does not change over time. Second we 
assume that firms will only pay attention to the moves of other firms when they have a 
market domain overlap with these firms. Furthermore, the current empirical setting is used as 
an illustration of the attention-based diffusion and does not test the robustness of the model. 
Further research is needed in this direction to test the validity of this model with empirical 
data. The model can be developed further by building in finer evolutionary phenomena such 
as mutualism, multiple competing routines, or disruptive innovation in routines.      
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To a large extent strategy research traces the differences in the ability to innovate across 
firms to a priori heterogeneity in resources and capabilities. This approach assumes that 
decision makers may have limited information about all innovation opportunities but are 
bound by a rational calculus when it comes to allocating resources and capabilities to various 
projects in the firm - without fully exploring the question: What guides the boundaries within 
which decision makers execute the rational choice process?  
In this dissertation we explored this question from an attention-based perspective, 
arguing that the act of choosing an option from the choice set is essentially a behavioural act 
and it is subject to the decision makers’ cognitive limitations. How a decision maker choses 
what to do, is influenced by structural constraints that firms use to focus and distribute the 
attention of its decision makers. Performance outcome is therefore not just a matter of 
availability of resources and capabilities, but it is also influenced by the decision makers’ 
commitment of resources and capabilities to various tasks, based on how their attention is 
focused on some opportunities more than others. 
By investigating the influence of structural constraints as attention-focusing 
mechanisms on the adoption of organisational routines, our intent is to contribute to the 
literature connecting the macro and micro perspectives on strategy and strategic decision-
making. In the first essay, we explore a macro-micro relationship and find that organisational 
mandates that focus decision makers attention to pursue explorative or exploitative 
innovation mandates, not only influence the adoption of AC routines, it also influences the 
effectiveness of the routines in furthering technological innovation. We believe that this study 
not only provides new insight into the interaction of macro level organisational mandates 
with micro level choices to adopt AC routines, it also opens up a new area of research on the 
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influence of innovation strategy as represented by R&D mandates on the mechanisms that 
build AC.  
The second essay explores a micro-micro relationship in which we set micro level 
aspiration under constraints to trigger search behaviour. We find that teams are more likely to 
come up with qualitatively superior routines when they work under high aspiration, set by 
high competitive pressures, and constraints in resources. In repeated tasks, we find that under 
low competitive pressure (i.e. low aspiration) agents are more likely to rely on labour effort 
to improve performance, indicating a preference towards labour effort. However, under high 
competitive pressure (i.e. high aspiration) agents increase cognitive effort and search for new 
techniques to improve performance. In novel tasks, where participants must rely on cognitive 
effort to perform, we find that groups under high competitive pressure (i.e. high aspiration) 
are more likely to apply cognitive effort to question implicit assumptions in their search for 
novel solutions. These results indicate that high competitive pressure (i.e. high aspiration) 
may frame agents to apply increased cognitive effort i.e. work smarter by questioning explicit 
and implicit routine assumptions that might otherwise limit performance. Insights from this 
essay suggest a relatively new area of research on the micro-foundations of strategic 
management i.e. how aspiration influence the way agents frame problems and subsequently 
choose to commit resources?  
In the third essay we explore a micro-macro relationship. We build an attention-based 
diffusion model for the spread of a routine throughout an industry where firms are engaged in 
multipoint competition. Using an agent-based simulation, we estimate the characteristics of 
early and late adopters of a new routine in such a system and propose that (i) early adopters 
of a new technology are more likely to be firms with a small reference group and high rivalry, 
while (ii) firms with large reference groups and low rivalry are least likely to be early 
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adopters. We illustrate this mechanism with data from the diffusion of SaaS in the packaged-
software industry. Results indicate that firms not only pay attention to the adoption decisions 
of competitors, they also pay attention to the ‘non-adoption’ decision of competitors.  
Together the three essays, each employing a distinct methodological approach, 
contribute to our understanding of how organisational mandates, competitive pressure under 
constraints, and multipoint competition act as structural constraints. These constraints focus 
the attention of decision makers and help them to filter though alternatives and make micro 
level choices to adopt (or not adopt) routines that influence performance at the macro level. 
From a practitioners point of view this dissertation provides insights into how 
decision making in organizations is influenced by structural constraints often brought about 
by corporate policies. While policies focus the attention of decision makers on priorities of 
the firm and therefore makes the process of decision making faster, the key question from an 
innovation management perspective remains – do these mechanisms also restrict decision 
makers from pursuing opportunities that lie outside the purview of the structural constraints? 
The evidence presented in this dissertation show this to be true i.e. decision makers tend to 
search for innovations within these structural constraints. On the one hand this can be 
restrictive but on the other hand discerning managers can learn from these insights and 
choose to alter the structural constraints to promote innovation. After all ‘creative’ is an 
anagram of ‘reactive’ – reactive to the constraints.       
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8. APPENDIX: 
 
8.1. THEORIES AND CORRESPONDING VARIABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE EFFECT OF 
SLACK  
 
Primary 
theoretical 
lens 
Study Measure of slack Measure of 
outcome variable  
Outcome 
Organisation 
theory 
(Singh, 
1986b) 
Absorbed slack 
(selling, general, and 
administrative 
expenses and 
working capital) and 
unabsorbed slack 
(cash and securities) 
Performance 
measured as a 
composite measure 
of financial 
performance and top 
executive subjective  
response to 
questionnaire 
A high level of 
absorbed and 
unabsorbed slack 
is related to good 
performance 
Organisation 
theory 
(Hambrick 
& 
D'Aveni, 
1988) 
Unabsorbed slack 
(equity-to-debt ratio 
and working capital 
as a percentage of 
sales) 
Performance 
measured as 
financial bankruptcy  
Bankrupt 
companies have 
substantially less 
slack than 
surviving 
companies 
Organisation 
theory 
(Bromiley, 
1991) 
Available slack 
(current ratio), 
recoverable slack 
(selling, general, and 
administrative 
expenses divided by 
sales), and potential 
slack (debt-to-equity 
ratio) 
Performance 
measures as return 
on total assets 
(ROA), return on 
equity (ROE) and 
return on sales 
(ROS)  
Slack, 
particularly 
available and 
potential slack, 
increases 
performance 
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Organisation 
theory 
(Miller & 
Leiblein, 
1996) 
Recoverable slack 
(accounts 
receivable/sales, 
inventory/sales, and 
selling, general, 
administrative 
expenses/sales) 
Performance as 
measured by Return 
on Assets  
Firm 
performance is 
strengthened by 
the  presence of 
slack 
Organisation 
theory 
(Reuer & 
Leiblein, 
2000) 
Recoverable slack 
(accounts 
receivable/sales, 
inventory/sales, and 
selling, general, 
administrative 
expenses/sales) 
Downside risk is a 
probability weighted 
function of below-
target performance 
outcomes. 
Performance 
measured by Return 
on Assets and Return 
on Equity  
Slack is 
negatively related 
to firms 
‘downside risk 
Agency 
theory 
(Davis & 
Stout, 
1992) 
Cash flow Performance 
measured by Return 
on Equity. To the 
extent that takeovers 
are meant to 
discipline 
underperforming 
firms, those that are 
earning higher 
returns should be 
subject to less risk of 
takeover 
Greater cash flow 
increases the risk 
of being taken 
over 
Inverted U 
relationship  
(Nohria & 
Gulati, 
1996) 
A single composite 
measure of slack 
based on two 
questionnaire items 
Performance 
measured by 
subjective responses 
from top executives. 
There is an 
inverse U-shaped 
relationship 
between slack 
and innovation: 
both too little and 
too much slack 
may be 
detrimental to 
innovation 
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Prior 
performance 
(Greenley 
& 
Oktemgil, 
1998) 
Generated slack (6 
measures) Cash flow 
/ investment, Debt to 
equity, FBIT/interest 
cover, Market to 
book value, Current 
assets/current 
liabilities, Sales per 
employee And 
Invested slack (4 
measures) 
Administration 
costs/sales, Dividend 
pay-out, Sales/total 
assets, Working 
capital/.sales 
Performance (5 
measures) Sales 
revenue, ROI, 
RONA, ROS, ROE 
A positive 
relationship 
between slack 
and performance 
exists only for 
high-performance 
firms; it does not 
exist for low-
performance ones 
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8.2. SUMMARY OF THE REVIEW OF STUDIES ON BRICOLAGE  
 
Study Focus Sample Measure of 
bricolage  
Key finding 
(Garud & 
Karnøe, 
2003) 
Bricolage as a 
process 
Case study 
on the 
emergence 
of wind 
turbines in 
Denmark 
and in 
United 
States 
As a processes that 
could harness the 
inputs of 
distributed actors 
who are embedded 
in accumulating 
artefacts, tools, 
practices, rules and 
knowledge. 
A process of bricolage 
has been more 
successful that a 
process aimed to 
generate 
‘breakthrough’ 
innovation   
(Baker & 
Nelson, 
2005) 
Bricolage as a 
process 
Entrepreneurial 
bricolage  
29 resource-
constrained 
firms 
Refusal to enact 
the limitations 
imposed by 
dominant 
definitions of 
resource 
environments 
Demonstrates the 
socially constructed 
nature of resource 
environments and the 
role of bricolage in this 
construction 
(Di 
Domenico, 
Haugh, & 
Tracey, 
2010) 
Bricolage as a 
process 
Social 
bricolage 
8 social 
enterprises  
Make do with 
resources at hand  
Key element of 
successful social 
bricolage are make do, 
refusal to be 
constrained by 
limitations and 
improvisation 
(Desa, 2012) Bricolage as a 
process 
Social 
bricolage 
202 
technology 
social 
ventures 
from 45 
countries 
Reconfiguring 
existing resources 
to meet 
institutional 
demands 
Social entrepreneurs 
who adopt a process of 
bricolage are better at 
succeeding in the face 
of institutional 
constraints 
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(Boxenbaum 
& Rouleau, 
2011) 
Bricolage as a 
process 
Theory 
building 
Theoretical 
frame for 
epistemic 
scripts of 
knowledge 
production 
Assembly of 
different 
knowledge 
elements that are 
readily available to 
the researcher to 
create new 
knowledge 
 
(Banerjee & 
Campbell, 
2009) 
Bricoleur 
characteristics 
197 firms in 
Life Science 
Diagnostic 
Inventor bricolage 
measured as the 
construction of 
technological 
capabilities 
through 
recombining the 
knowledge of 
inventors on hand 
to address 
opportunities. 
Inventors with less 
assimilative capacity 
and more creative 
capacity in teams 
where there is relevant 
experience will 
promote inventor 
bricolage 
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8.3. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
History of the R&D subsidiary 
• When was the subsidiary founded? Why was it founded?  
• What were the goals at the time of founding? How does it fit into the R&D strategy of 
the firm?  
• Who made the decision? Who else was involved? If you were involved, what was 
your role?  
Mandate: Content of work  
• What were the initial projects given to this subsidiary? What are the key projects 
currently managed in this subsidiary? 
• What would you say are the common features of the projects delivered from this 
subsidiary? How has this changed over its history?  
• How do you see the role of the subsidiary in the global R&D network? 
Mandate process 
• What is the focus of this subsidiary? How has it evolved? 
• How are projects assigned to this subsidiary? Who makes the decision? 
• What are the strengths in this location? What are the threats? How do you see the 
project portfolio evolving in the future? 
• How are projects evaluated? 
AC routines 
• What have been/ are the most important knowledge related practices in the 
subsidiary? (Focus on 2-3 years intervals since the foundation of the subsidiary) 
• Do teams from this subsidiary communicate with other subsidiaries? How? 
• Do teams from this subsidiary communicate with externals in this location? How? 
• Ask about the roll-out of the 5 internal AC routines and 3 external AC routines and its 
impact  
  
155 
 
8.4 SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR EXPERIMENT TASK 1 
 
  
N
o
t a
t a
ll 
(1)
 
2 3 4 5 6 
Co
m
pl
et
el
y 
(7)
 
1 How clear are you about what your team's 
objective are? 
       
2 How far are you in agreement with these 
objectives? 
       
3 To what extent do you think other team 
members agree with these objectives? 
       
4 To what extent do you think your team's 
objectives can actually be achieved? 
       
5 The team is always moving forward towards the 
development of new answers? 
       
6 The team is open and responsive to change?        
7 People in this team are always looking for fresh 
new ways of looking at the problem? 
       
8 People in this team cooperate in order to help 
develop and apply new ideas? 
       
9 Do your colleagues provide useful ideas and 
practical help to enable you to do the job to the 
best of your abilities? 
       
10 Do your colleagues monitor each other so as to 
maintain a higher standard of work? 
       
11 Are the team members prepared to question the 
basis of what the team is doing? 
       
12 Does the team critically appraise potential 
weaknesses in what it is doing in order to 
achieve the best possible outcome? 
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13 How anxious did you feel during the group 
discussion? 
       
14 How stressed to did you feel during the group 
discussion? 
       
15 Did you feel pressed for time during the group 
discussion? 
       
16 Did you feel that other group members would 
disapprove if your performance was poor? 
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8.5 R CODE FOR SIMULATION 
 
# R Script for the diffusion of a routine as a competitive action in an industry where firms are 
engaged in multipoint competition 
# Author: Aneesh Banerjee 
# September 2014, results presented at SMS 2014 
 
# Start 
 
# creating a network table 
options (width = 120)  # setting the width for better reading 
n <- 100  # n is the number of agents in the network 
set.seed (234) 
random <- runif (n^2, 0, 1.0) # generating the randon network strengths 
s.n <- matrix ( random, nrow = n, ncol = n) 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  s.n [i,i] <- 0 
} 
 
# overlap under 15% percentage is counted as 0 
for (j in 1:n) { 
  for (i in 1:n) { 
    if (s.n [j,i] < 0.15) s.n [j,i] = 0 
    else s.n [j,i] <- s.n [j,i]  
  } 
} 
 
# making the zero overlaps symmetric 
for (j in 1:n) { 
  for (i in 1:n) { 
    if (s.n [j,i] < 0.1) s.n [i,j] = 0 
    else s.n [j,i] <- s.n [j,i]  
  } 
} 
 
# Create categories 
# Number of connections 
s.n2 <- s.n 
for (j in 1:n) { 
  for (i in 1:n) { 
    if (s.n2 [i,j] > 0) s.n2 [i,j] = 1 
    else s.n2 [i,j] <- 0  
  } 
} 
 
# row vector with all 1 
r.v1 <- matrix (sample (c(1,1), size = n, replace = TRUE), nrow = 1, ncol = n)  
 
# vector of number of connetions 
number.conn <- r.v1 %*% s.n2 
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mean.conn <- rowMeans(number.conn, na.rm = FALSE, dims = 1) 
 
# labels 5 and 3 for number of connections 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if (number.conn [1,i] > mean.conn) number.conn [1,i] <- 5 
  else number.conn [1,i] <- 3  
} 
 
# vector of number of connections 
s.n3 <- s.n 
s.n3 [s.n3 == 0] <- NA 
mean.overlap <- matrix (colMeans (s.n3, na.rm = TRUE, dims = 1), nrow = 1, ncol = n) 
 
# labels 10 and 6 of mean overlap 
popmean.overlap <- rowMeans(mean.overlap, na.rm = FALSE, dims = 1) 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if (mean.overlap [1,i] > popmean.overlap) mean.overlap [1,i] <- 10 
  else mean.overlap [1,i] <- 6  
} 
 
# Final ABCD categorization  
catagory <- number.conn + mean.overlap 
i.catagory <- catagory 
table (catagory) 
 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if ( catagory [1,i] == 15) catagory [1,i] = c("C") 
  else catagory [1,i] <- catagory [1,i] 
} 
 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if ( catagory [1,i] == 11) catagory [1,i] = c("B") 
  else catagory [1,i] <- catagory [1,i] 
} 
 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if ( catagory [1,i] == 13) catagory [1,i] = c("D") 
  else catagory [1,i] <- catagory [1,i] 
} 
 
for (i in 1:n) { 
  if ( catagory [1,i] == 9) catagory [1,i] = c("A") 
  else catagory [1,i] <- catagory [1,i] 
} 
 
# names for firms  
colnames (catagory) <- paste ('Firm', 1:n) 
a <- table (catagory) 
a 
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# Starting conditions 
# t.max in the maximum time period  
# s.c is the randomized initial condition 
# da and db is the number of agents that have the characteristic 
 
time.final2 <- matrix (sample (c(0,0), size = n, replace = TRUE), nrow = 1, ncol = n) 
final2 <- matrix (sample (c(0,0), size = 25, replace = TRUE), nrow = 1, ncol = 25) 
 
for (v in 1:100) { 
   
  # random row vectors ra, measure of resistance  
  n <- 100 
  set.seed (v) 
  rdm <- 13 
  random <- runif (n, 0 , rdm) # changed r 
  ra <- matrix ( random, nrow = 1, ncol = n) 
   
  final1 <- matrix (sample (c(0,0), size = 25, replace = TRUE), nrow = 1, ncol = 25) 
  time.final1 <- matrix (sample (c(0,0), size = n, replace = TRUE), nrow = 1, ncol = n) 
   
  for (u in 1:100) {  
     
    t.max <- 25 
    t <- 1 
     
    # diffusion of action  
   
    da <- 1 
    diffa <- 1 
    s.c.at1 <- 0 
     
     
    #------- Starting conditions for action i.e. seed  
     
     
    s.c.a <- matrix (sample (c(0,0), size = n, replace = TRUE), nrow = 1, ncol = n)  
    initiala <- c(u) 
    s.c.a [1,initiala] <- 1 
     
    matrix (i.catagory) 
    t(matrix (i.catagory)) 
    i.catagory2 <- s.c.a * i.catagory 
    i.condition.a <- sum (i.catagory2) 
     
    if ( i.condition.a == 15) i.condition.a <- c("C") 
    if ( i.condition.a == 11) i.condition.a <- c("B") 
    if ( i.condition.a == 13) i.condition.a <- c("D") 
    if ( i.condition.a == 9) i.condition.a <- c("A") 
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    # --------------- 
     
    # matrix multiplication loops 
     
    time.meter <- s.c.a # adding a time meter 
    while (t < t.max) {  
       
      # first loop 
       
      pa <- s.c.a %*% s.n 
       
      pa2 <- pa 
       
      for (i in 1:n) { 
        pa2 [1,i] <- pa2 [1,i]/number.conn [1,i] 
      } 
       
      cert <- s.c.a %*% s.n2  
      for (i in 1:n) { 
        pa2 [1,i] <- pa2 [1,i] * cert [1,i] 
      } 
       
       
      qa <- pa2-ra 
       
      for (i in 1:n) { 
        if (qa [1,i] > 0) qa [1,i] = 1 
        else qa[1,i] = 0 
      } 
       
      s.c.a <- s.c.a + qa 
      for (i in 1:n) { 
        if (s.c.a [1,i] >= 1) s.c.a [1,i] = 1 
        else s.c.a [1,i] = 0 
      } 
       
      s.c.at1 <- s.c.a 
       
      time.meter <-time.meter + s.c.a 
      sumqa <- sum(qa) 
      da <- sum (s.c.a) 
      #da 
      diffa <- c(diffa,da) 
      #diffa 
       
 
      #  Optional random decay coefficient a1r (Option not used) 
       
      #      if (da < 50){ 
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      #        a1r <- matrix (sample (c(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1), size = n, replace = TRUE), nrow = 1, 
ncol = n)  
      #        s.c.a <- s.c.a - a1r 
      #        for (i in 1:n) { 
      #          if (s.c.a [1,i] < 0) s.c.a [1,i] = 0 
      #          else s.c.a[1,i] = s.c.a[1,i] 
      #        } 
      #      } 
      #      else s.c.a. <- s.c.a 
       
      t<- t + 1 
       
    } 
    time.final1 <- rbind (time.final1, time.meter) 
    final1 <- rbind(final1 , diffa) 
     
  } 
  #  final1 
   
  final2 <- rbind(final2, final1) 
  time.final2 <- rbind (time.final2, time.final1) 
   
} 
 
#final2 
final2 <- final2[!(apply(final2, 1, function(y) any(y == 0))),] # removes all 0 value rows from 
final 2 
diff.final <- colMeans(final2, na.rm = FALSE, dims = 1) # taking sum of the coloumns 
plot (diff.final)#, ylim=c(0,100)) 
lines (diff.final) 
title(main =  rdm, sub = mean.conn , popmean.overlap) 
 
 
write.csv(final2, " Diff_PatternvXX.csv") 
write.csv(time.final2, "D iff_TimingvXX.csv") 
write.csv(catagory, " Diff_catagoryvXX.csv") 
write.csv(ra, "ResistanceXX.csv") 
write.csv(number.conn, "ConnectionsXX.csv") 
write.csv(mean.overlap, "MeanoverlapXX.csv") 
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8.6 CLASSIFICATION BY THE STRENGTH OF COMPETITIVE RIVALRY AND SIZE OF 
THE REFERENCE GROUP 
 
Firm Category by (i) The strength of competitive rivalry and (ii) The 
size of the reference group.  
A = (low, small) B = (low, large)  
C = (high, large), D = (high, small) 
Ericsson A 
Hitachi B 
Siemens B 
NEC A 
Intel A 
Synopsys A 
Apple A 
McKesson A 
ADP A 
NetApp A 
Hexagon B 
Cadence Design Systems B 
TrendMicro A 
Teradata A 
DATEV A 
OpenText A 
Avaya C 
Mentor Graphics C 
Salesforce.com D 
Autodesk A 
Citrix D 
PTC D 
IBM B 
Oracle C 
Microsoft C 
SAP C 
Intuit D 
Cisco D 
Sage C 
Nuance Communication A 
Symantec D 
HP B 
CA B 
VMware A 
Fujitsu B 
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Wolters Kluwer A 
Compuware B 
EMC (Excluding VMV) A 
Adobe B 
SunGard C 
Software AG C 
TIBCO C 
SAS C 
BMC A 
Cerner C 
ANSYS A 
Infor C 
Red Hat A 
Dassault Systèmes B 
Attachmate Group A 
 
